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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to illustrate the investment-cash flow sensitivity of constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Using data from 2,233 US manufacturing firms over 1999 to 
2008, several findings present. Firstly, cash flow is found to significantly affect 
ILUP¶V investment behaviour. Secondly, when firms are labelled as constrained and 
unconstrained by dividend and firm size dummy, unconstrained firms are found 
more sensitive if the sample is split by dividend dummy. Meanwhile, the result is 
reversed if firms in the sample are separated by firm size. Finally, the research on 
splitting firms by the two criterions interacted reveals that regardless of firm size, 
high dividend payers are always more sensitive. Similarly, for firms at identical 
dividend payment level, small firms are more sensitive.  
 
Several econometric techniques are employed to generate the above results. OLS, 
fixed-effect model, first-differencing transformation and instrumental variables by 
GMM are utilized to test the significance of cash flow on investment. For the test of 
constrained and unconstrained firms, fixed-effect and instrumental variables by 
GMM are employed. However, GMM is found to exhibit weak estimation power.  
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CHAPTER ĉ INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background 
Companies make investment decisions in seeking for better business opportunities 
and future development. In the early days, investment decisions are considered 
irrelevant to financial status. Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrated this by 
assuming perfect and complete capital market, in which transaction cost and taxes 
are absence. However, in the real world, perfect and complete capital market does 
not exist. Information asymmetry and agency costs make the choice of financial 
decisions complicated. Internal and external capital cannot substitute each other 
perfectly. In theory, external capital is believed to be much more costly than 
internal funds. Researches carried out by Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), 
Myers and Majluf (1984), and Myers (1984) have exposed the problem of 
information asymmetry in capital market. Meanwhile, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) 
and Gertler (1992) demonstrated the impact of agency costs which add cost 
premium to external capital. All those studies show that external finance is more 
H[SHQVLYH WKDQ LQWHUQDO ILQDQFH 7KHUHIRUH ILUPV¶ LQYHVWPHQW GHFLVLRQV DUH
constrained by the availability of relatively cheaper internal capital. By contrast, 
firms who are capable to undertake the higher cost and thus have access both to 
internal funds and external capital, are considered as financially unconstrained.  
 
In their influential work, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) proved that 
financially constrained firms are more sensitive to internal cash flow than 
unconstrained ones. The study groups firms by dividend payout ratio. Firms who 
pay low dividends are considered as constrained because they retain most of cash 
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inflow for investment and thus indicate that they have limited access to expensive 
external capital. Other researches have found similar relationship between 
investment and cash flow. For example, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) on 
group membership of Japanese companies, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) on 
firms accessing to commercial paper and bond market, and Kadapakkam, Kumar 
and Riddick (1998) on firm size. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) proposed 
challenge to Fazzari HW DO¶s findings. Based on quantitative and qualitative 
LQIRUPDWLRQIURPILUPV¶DQQXDOUHSRUWVWKH\IRXQGWKDWXQFRQVWUDLQHGILUPVDSSHDU
as more sensitive to cash flow. The debate raises the issue that the choice of 
measurement to financial constraints makes tremendous difference on the 
outcome. Subsequent studies have addressed the problem of financial constraints, 
and find dissimilar results even for tests on the same sample but different financial 
constraints, such as Moyen (2004) and Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004).  
 
1.2 Introduction to This Study 
This study tries to address several basic questions on the investment cash flow 
debate. Firstly, does internal finance, which is estimated by cash flow, significantly 
affect investment decisions? Almost all the literatures give positive answer to this 
question. This study is expected to provide further empirical evidence. In order to 
minimize factitious error, four econometric techniques are employed to process the 
research, including simple OLS, fixed-effect (within) estimator, first-differencing 
transformation and instrumental variables by Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM). Prerequisite conditions for each method are examined for the validity of 
estimated coefficients, making sure that there is no bias or inconsistence in the 
outcome. Secondly, as previous literatures show different magnitude of sensitivity 
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for constrained and unconstrained firms, this study split firms into the two groups 
by two criterions, which are dividend and firm size. These two are the most widely 
used and accepted standard to separate companies. Firm size is identified by total 
assets and sales. Unlike other researches, this study does not test the two 
sub-samples independently. Instead, dummy variables are created to label firms 
from different groups. An advantage of using dummy variable is that it 
conveniences the regression process. It is not necessary to run regression model 
twice for different groups of data (Karafiath 1988). In addition, Schiantarelli (1996) 
also suggested using dummy variables to control financial constraints. To test the 
sensitivity for constrained and unconstrained group, fixed-effect estimator and 
instrumental variable by GMM will be employed as the test technique. Thirdly, 
results for different splitting criterions will be compared, in order to address the 
effect of different measurement of financial constraints on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Additional to dividend dummy and firm size dummy, this study provides 
a new splitting method by interacting the two dummy variables together, as 
Schiantarelli (1996) claimed that dividing firms by one criterion may not be 
sufficient. The test will be carried out by fixed-effect model and GMM as well. 
 
Before making empirical tests, previous literatures will be generally reviewed to 
EXLOG WKHRUHWLFDOEDVLV )LUPV¶GHFLVLRQVRQ ILQDQFLQJ LQYHVWPHQWVE\ LQWHUQDORU
external capital will be reviewed first. ,Q0RGLJOLDQLDQG0LOOHU¶VZRUOGWKHUHLVQR
difference between internal and external finance. However, Myers (1984) 
challenged the theory by putting forward pecking order theory, of which 
information asymmetry is the major concern. He believed that firms choose to 
finance their investments by financial hierarchy. External finance, due to 
information asymmetry and thus more expensive, is the last option for financing. 
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0\HUV¶DUJXPHQWHPSKDVL]HGWKHGLYHUJHQWZD\VRIILQDQFLQJDQGVWLPXODWHGWKH
study of investment-cash flow sensitivity. There are many models to study such 
relationship, including neoclassical model and the most widely used model in recent 
VWXGLHV 7RELQ¶V 4 PRGHO 7KH PDMRU GHEDWH IRU 7RELQ¶V 4 PRGHO FRPHV IURP
financial constraints and calculation of Q. These will be discussed in detail in the 
literature review part.  
 
1.3 Layout of This Study 
The remainder of this paper will be allocated as follows. Chapter Ċ will be reviewing 
previous literatures on the issues discussed above, internal finance versus external 
ILQDQFHQHRFODVVLFDOPRGHOYHUVXV7RELQ¶V4PRGHODVZHOODVWKHDUJXPHQWVRQ
ILQDQFLDO FRQVWUDLQWV DQG 7RELQ¶V 4 ,Q &KDSWHU ċ, detailed methodology for 
empirical tests will present, including variables to be used in the tests, the 
calculation of variables, models to be tested, and econometric techniques to be 
employed. Chapter Č contains data information and regression results from the 
regression tests, as well as discussion of the outcome obtained and limitations for 
the research. The final chapter, Chapter č concludes the entire work. 
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CHAPTER Ċ LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Trade-off between Internal and External Finance 
2.1.1 MM Theory 
Since the 60s of last century, capital and investment has long been discussed by 
many researchers and scholars. An early work by Miller and Modigliani (1958) 
SURYHGWKDWDFRPSDQ\¶VFRVWRIFDSLWDOZDVLUUHOHYDQWWRLWVFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHDOVR
known as MM Proposition ĉ). It is equal to the cost of capital as if the firm is solely 
financed by equity. An implication of their finds for investment decision is that ³the 
cut-RIISRLQWIRULQYHVWPHQWLQWKHILUPZLOOLQDOOFDVHVEHǏk and will be completely 
unaffected by the type of security used to finance the investment (Miller and 
0RGLJOLDQLS ´ ZKHUHǏk can be interpreted as equivalent to the cost of 
equity of an unleveraged firm. In other words, Miller and Modigliani suggest that 
firms can finance their investments by any source. Internal or external funds do not 
make a difference. The decision is irrelevant to financial conditions.  
 
MM theory is derived based on some crucial assumptions. Pike and Neale (2006) 
conclude some key assumptions as follows. First of all, all investors are price-takers 
and rational. No one is capable to influence the market price. Secondly, all the 
participants can lend or borrow at the same risk-free rate. Furthermore, there are 
no transaction costs and no taxes, for instance personal and corporate income tax. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\ILUPVDUHJURXSHGLQWRGLIIHUHQW³ULVNFODVVHV ´)RUDOOILUPVLQHDFKRI
the groups, the market seeks for the same return. Firms cannot make any 
investment at the risk beyond or below the risk class. In general, MM theory will 
only apply in a perfect capital market which, in reality, is not the case. 
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2.1.2 Pecking Order Theory 
In the 1980s, Myers and Majluf (1984) present another theory to explain capital 
structure which in Myers (1984) is referred to as pecking order theory. Their 
discussion takes information asymmetry into consideration, which means 
managers have superior information than investors, which does apply in real life. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) reported several strategies that firms employ to finance 
favourable investment. They prefer safer securities than risky ones, which imply 
that bond market is the wise choice when seeking for external finance. In addition, 
if the company has run out of cash or the cash flow is not sufficient to support the 
investment, the company, IRUWKHH[LVWLQJVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVW, may choose to 
give up the opportunity rather than UDLVLQJH[WHUQDOIXQGV7KLUGO\LWLVWKHILUPV¶
choice to cut back dividend in order to reserve for future investment. An alternative 
wD\ WR DFFXPXODWH FDVK LV E\ LVVXLQJ HTXLW\ DW WKH SHULRG ZKHQ PDQDJHU¶V
information advantage is at minimum level. Finally, firm should not pay dividend if 
it has to sell equity or other risky securities to generate cash. However, Myers and 
Majluf (1984) failed to present optimal issue strategy. Other researchers also have 
found evidence that companies prefer internal funds to external funds when 
financing an investment (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein 1994, Oliner and 
Rudebusch 1992).  
 
In his solely authored paper, Myers (1984) summarized pecking order theory as 
follows: (Myers 1984, p. 581)  
x ³)LUPVSUHIHULQWHUQDOILQDQFH 
x They adapt their target dividend payout ratios to their investment 
opportunities, although dividends are sticky and target payout ratios are 
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only gradually adjusted to shifts in the extent of valuable investment 
opportunities. 
x Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctuations in profitability and 
investment opportunities, mean that internally-generated cash flow may be 
more or less than investment outlays. If it is less, the firm first draws down 
its cash balance or marketable securities portfolio. 
x If external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first. That is, 
they start with debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible 
ERQGVWKHQSHUKDSVHTXLW\DVDODVWUHVRUW´ 
 
The pecking order theory is derived based on some assumptions as well. As Myers 
and Majluf (1984) stated clearly, due to the cost of information transmission, 
managers has information that is not released to investors, which makes managers 
obtain an information advantage. Secondly, firms are assumed to have one asset 
and one opportunity to invest. The project requires the firm to invest all or 
otherwise zero. The firm cannot invest in part of the project. Furthermore, capital 
market is assumed to be perfect and efficient. All the public information is costless 
and available simultaneously to each participant in the market. The transaction cost 
for issuing stock is eliminated. Finally, the share price on the market is assumed to 
EHUHIOHFWLQJWKHILUP¶VH[SHFWHGIXWXUHYDOXHVXEMHFWWRWKHavailable information 
that the market possess.  
 
Many researchers have done academic researches to test the validity of pecking 
order theory. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), using a sample of 157 firms from 
year 1971 to 1989, find strong support to pecking order theory. They demonstrate 
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that pecking order theory is better in explaining the investment behaviour of 
corporations. The result is also robust when tested with target adjustment model 
(the other model that is used to compare with pecking order theory). Additionally, 
they find that firms plan to cover the deficit by debt instead of stock, which is also 
in line with pecking order theory. López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) find 
support for pecking order theory in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). 
They use data of 3,569 Spanish SMEs over 10 years and try to compare two models 
which are pecking order and tradeoff theory. The results reflect clear evidence in 
favour of pecking order theory. Similarly, Zoppa and McMahon (n.d.), who studied 
Australian SMEs, find supportive evidence for pecking order theory. The sample 
contains data from 871 Australian SMEs over the period from 1995 to 1998. They 
also suggest further development of pecking order theory which could reflect more 
financing behaviour of SMEs. The suggested pecking order theory is organized as 
follows: 
x Reinvestment of profits  
x Short-term debt (maybe personal credit card financing). 
x Long-term debt (maybe from families and friends). 
x New equity capital injections from existing owners and owner-managers 
(maybe families and friends, with zero or low dividend). 
x New equity capital from hitherto uninvolved parties (maybe new owners and 
owner-managers, venture capitalists, business angels and Second Board 
listing). 
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There are researches give reverse opinions against pecking order theory as well. 
Franka and Goyal (2003) claim pecking order theory is not robust for their test. 
They tested the theory on publicly traded American companies over the period from 
1971 to 1998. They find that internal fund is not sufficient to finance the investment 
and thus external funds are more widely employed. Among the external funds, debt 
is not found dominate to shares. Pecking order theory does not explain the sample 
well. They give a possible reason for the failure of pecking order by stating that 
more small firms, whose behaviour cannot be explained by pecking order theory, 
have gone for public trading. It lowers the average explaining power of pecking 
order theory. Using sample from Chinese listed companies, Ni and Yu (2008) claim 
no evidence is found to follow pecking order. Additionally, they found no evidence 
that firms with moderate debt level will follow pecking order theory (which is one of 
the findings in Myers 1984). It might because of the obstacle to enter Chinese bond 
market. There are strict criterions to follow if a company desires loan from the four 
state-owned commercial banks. Another reason could be due to the incompletion of 
Chinese legal system. Companies may prefer issuing shares without considering 
PLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUV¶ rights properly, which not protected appropriately by law.  
 
2.2 Financial Constraints 
In Miller and Modigliani¶s world, there is no financial constraint. As the market is 
supposed to be well-functioning, firPV¶DELOLW\RIUDLVLQJIXQGVis unlimited. The only 
concern for investment is the price at which a company can obtain funds. Even 
companies are short of internal funds, the gap can be easily offset by external 
capital because the outside investors keep seeking for such opportunities to make 
profit (Bond and Meghir 1994). However, the research into market behaviour 
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suggested that internal funds are cheaper than external capital, due to information 
asymmetry and incentive problems. These constrain firm¶s financial behaviour. 
 
Fazzari et al (1988) emphasized the effect of asymmetric information on raising 
external finance. For issuing new shares, as external investors cannot obtain the 
information that is kept inside the company, the cost of using that fund is higher. 
The managers are assumed to have better information about the quality of the 
assets and return of the investment. New shareholders, who cannot distinguish 
firms by quality due to information asymmetry and thus value firms as population 
average, do not know exactly how the investment will perform. Therefore, to 
compensate the potential lose on ILQDQFLQJ³OHPRQV´$NHUORIWKH\ZRXOG
expect higher return from investing in good companies. In this case, the managers 
of good companies may suffer from higher issuing cost of new shares, which may 
H[FHVV ³WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ FRVW RI LQWHUQDO ILQDQFH IDFHG E\ H[LVWLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV
)D]]DUL+XEEDUGDQG3HWHUVHQS ´7KHDUJXPHQWIRULVVXLQJQHZGHEW
is similar to the above discussion. Asymmetric information can also cause the 
interest rate to rise and force good borrowers leave the market. In summary, 
internal funds have cost advantage over external funds. In addition, in his 
co-authored paper with Athey, Fazzari presented that finance market might suffer 
from information asymmetry (Fazzari and Athey 1987) as well. Companies usually 
show the bright side of the investment to their lenders. Any information that is from 
the dark side is kept secret. Also, firms are not willing to release any information 
that may harm their competitive advantage, for example new technology.  
 
Information asymmetry can lead to credit rationing as well (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 
cited in Fazzari and Athey 1987). Credit rationing happens when the lender supply 
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smaller size of loan than the demand, even if the lender has enough fund (Jaffee 
and Russell 1976). Information asymmetry has two effects on lenders, which are 
adverse selection effect and incentive effect. As the lender does not have the full 
LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHERUURZHUV¶DELOLW\RI UHSD\PHQWWKH\VHWXSD³VFUHHQLQJ
GHYLFH´ZKLFKLVWKHLQWHUHVWUDWH7KRVHERUURZHUVZKRDUHZLOOLQJWRSD\DKLJK
interest rate are considered as riskier, because the probability of repayment for 
such borrowers is low (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). In other words, the higher the 
interest rate, probably the lower the profit the lender can make from the loan, due 
to the higher default risk. As a result, there is an optimal interest rate for lenders 
beyond which the return for lending loans may decrease. Therefore, the lenders are 
not willing to raise interest rate even if there is excess demand for loan. In contrast, 
they control the total amount of loans issued, which lead to the phenomena that 
some borrowers can get the loan while others with same credit cannot (ibid). Credit 
rationing makes the use of external finance less favourable than internal funds. 
 
Furthermore, agency cost also limits the use of external finance. Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) demonstrated that agency cost could add premium to external 
finance, which makes external finance more expensive. Fazzari et al (1988) 
claimed that it could be created if a company employs large amount of debt. The 
managers may act in the interest of shareholders while ignore the rights of 
bondholders (moral hazard). Knowing this, bondholders will ask the company to 
provide some protection against such behaviour, for example covenant (Smith and 
Warner 1979), which may be costly and hence raise the cost of using debt. 
 
Fazzari et al (1988) explained other factors that give cost advantage to internal 
funds, such as tax advantage and cost of financial distress. According to US tax 
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system, the taxation for dividend is higher than that for retained earnings. 
Therefore, companies would rather maintain the earnings inside than paying out 
dividend to save taxation cost, which implies that internal capital is cheaper than 
external funds. When the company is not able to pay the interest for debt, financial 
distress problem occurs (see research by Opler 1993). The threat of financial 
distress raises the cost of debt, because investors of external finance will need a 
premium to compensate for the risk of company going bankruptcy. 
 
2.3 Measurement of Financial Constraints 
From the debate between Fazzari et al (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997), it is 
clear that the choice of measurement of financial constraints can lead to diverse 
results. Moyen (2004) confirms this view in the research. She develops two models 
to identify firms with and without constraints, which is called constrained and 
unconstrained model. For unconstrained firms, she claims that dividend payment, 
investment, new debt issue and the interest rate for debt are the four factors a 
company needs to consider. The unconstrained modeOFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDV³ILUP
invests up to the point where the cost of one unit of capital equals next period's 
H[SHFWHGGLVFRXQWHGPDUJLQDOFRQWULEXWLRQWRGLYLGHQGV0R\HQS ´
Also, the model requires firms to balance between investment and interest rate, as 
high interest rate will attract more debt and hence benefit the company from tax 
shield effect but at the same time, raise the default risk from equity holders. To 
make the balance, the tax benefit of using one unit of debt, if equity holders do not 
default, should be equal to the default cost of the unit of debt if equity holders 
choose to do so. For constrained firms, Moyen allows the firm to have a constant 
debt obligation. As she explains, a firm may have accessed to external finance in 
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the past, but later it was constrained. The debt obligation is left and should be taken 
into consideration. The constrained model limits firms¶ investment to the point that 
the shadow cost of one unit of capital equals to the expected discounted marginal 
contribution to dividend of next period, if the equity holders do not default. For both 
of the models, equity holder may choose to default when income shock is much 
smaller than expected and the future discounted value is not large enough to cover 
the interest payment. 
 
In order to study the influence of measurement of financial constraints, she sets up 
five criterions. A firms is considered as constrained if it pays low dividend, or if it 
has low cash flow, or if it is predicted by the constrained model as constrained, or 
if it is described as constrained by the constrained model and has run out of internal 
IXQGVRULILWKDVORZ&OHDU\¶V,QGH[9DOXHas defined in Cleary 1999). She divided 
the 2000 firms in the simulated sample by those five criterions and run the 
regression model which is developed as in Fazzari et al (1988). Results show that 
constrained firms reveal lower investment-cash flow sensitivity (Kaplan and 
=LQJDOHV¶V UHVXOWV LI ILUPV DUH GLYLGHG E\ FRQVWUDLQHG PRGHO FULWHULRQ DQG E\
&OHDU\¶V,QGH[FULWHULRQBy contrast, Firms, identified by the other three criterions 
as constrained, show higher sensitivity (Fazzari et al¶VUHVXOWV  
 
Moyen (2004) gives possible explanations for this. To understand Kaplan and 
=LQJDOHV¶V UHVXOWV theoretically, higher cash flow leads to higher investment. 
However, constrained firms identified by constrained model have to choose from 
paying dividend or investment, which weakens the link between cash flow and 
investment. On the other hand, unconstrained firms borrow from external source to 
finance the investment, where the regression model does not control the effect of 
 14 
 
such capital. It magnifies the investment-cash flow sensitivity for unconstrained 
firms. By contrast, Fazzari et al¶V UHVXOWV DSSHDU EHFDXVH XQFRQVWUDLQHG ILUPV
identified by unconstrained models are more likely to have heavier burden of 
interest payment, which indicates higher debt-to-equity ratio. Instead of not being 
able to pay dividend, these firms do not have to pay much dividend as they have 
less equity in the capital structure, although they appear to be low-dividend firms. 
These firms always bear higher sensitive on investment policies.  
 
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) make some similar discussion on financial 
constraints. However, instead of studying investment-cash flow sensitivity, their 
research is focused on cash flow sensitivity of cash, which they define the term as 
³ILQDQFLDOFRQVWUDLQWVVKRXOGEHUHODWHGWRDILUP
VSURSHQVLW\WRVDYHFDVKRXWRI
FDVKLQIORZV$OPHLGD&DPSHOORDQG:HLVEDFKS ´,IWKHFDVKIORZ
sensitivity of cash is high, then the firm is considered as constrained. They created 
five criterions for classifying firms, which are firm payout policy, asset size, bond 
ratings, commercial paper ratings, KZ index as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Using data from publicly traded manufacturing firms, they find that the former four 
criterions apply that constrained firms appear to be highly sensitive to cash flow. 
The only exception comes from KZ index. Furthermore, they find that for 
constrained firms, the cash-cash flow sensitivity is negatively correlated with 
macroeconomic change, for example a recession, which means constrained firms 
save more during recession. This is true for the first four criterions but KZ index. 
 
Unlike the previous papers, Almeida and Campello (2002) provided a different 
measure of financial constraints. They measure the constraints by quantity instead 
of quality. In the paper, they try to illustrate the effect of credit rationing on 
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investment-cash flow sensitivity, as ³LW LV WKHDYDLODELOLW\RIcredit, not the price 
which they [firms] have to pay, which limits their investment´ (Greenwald, Stiglitz, 
and Weiss 1984, p.194, cited in Almeida and Campello 2002). According to their 
definition of constraint, they come up with different results as Fazzari et al (1988). 
The investment-cash flow sensitivity is found to decrease with financial constraints. 
Additionally, their find the relationship is not monotonic. They explain that under 
Fazzari et al¶s DQG.DSODQDQG=LQJDOHV¶DVVXPSWLRQILUPVFDQXVHWKHH[WHUQal 
source as much as they can afford. Firms face the trade off between marginal cost 
of external finance and marginal productivity of investment. However, the 
interpretation of such functions is DOZD\V DPELJXRXV $OPHLGD DQG &DPSHOOR¶V
model sets all constrained firms at similar level of marginal cost of external finance 
DQGKHQFHDYRLGWKDWSUREOHP)XUWKHUPRUH$OPHLGDDQG&DPSHOOR¶VPRGHOKDV
direct control over the ability of raising funds which makes it possible to capture the 
³PXOWLSOLHU´HIIHFW  
 
Schiantarelli (1996) discussed several problems in measurement of financial 
FRQVWUDLQWV)LUVWO\VRPHVWXGLHVIL[WKHILUPV¶financial status through the entire 
sample period. However, firms could possibly switch side during the sample period. 
For instance, one can be constrained in the past but no longer so in the later years. 
In the research, firms should be allowed to transfer between the two statuses. 
Secondly, the criterion used to separate samples into different groups may be 
endogenous. When firms are divided by dividend payment or firm size, endogenous 
problem is particularly true, because investment decision and dividend or firm size 
are inter-correlated. Schiantarelli suggests using lagged instrumental variable (IV) 
and GMM procedure to solve such problem. Additionally, one can also employ 
dummy variable in the regression model to interact the coefficient of cash flow 
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variable. Thirdly, Schiantarelli claims that it is not necessary to divide firms based 
on predetermined criterions, aiming to obtain consistent estimator. This may lead 
to the error discussed in the first point. Firms may be misclassified using 
predetermined information. Finally, it may be not sufficient to separate firms by 
only one characteristic, which is especially true when one uses time dummy to 
capture the macro-environment conditions. It is suggested to use endogenous 
witching regression method to address this issue. By doing so, firms are not split by 
clear criterions, but DVVLJQHGWRIXQFWLRQVRIILUPV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVGHSHQGLQJRQ
which firms can be considered as either of the two conditions (like the constrained 
and unconstrained model developed by Moyen 2004).  
 
Beyond the problems, Schiantarelli (1996) also states several ways of sample split. 
Despite the most commonly used method, such as dividend payout and firm size, 
he added business group, agency problem and concentration of ownership, and 
variation over time in the tightness of financial constraints. The criterion of business 
group has been used in Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) who studied 
Japanese firms and found strong support to Fazzari et al. Agency problem is 
minimised if monitoring is efficient. The criterion is employed in Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1992) who found structure of share holding does not affect the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. In the information-based models of investment, 
financial constraints are expected to vary according to the change of 
macro-environment and monetary policy. During a recession or after tightening 
monetary policy, fewer firms are expected to seek external finance, whose cost is 
too high. Using endogenous switching regression approach, Hu and Schiantarelli 
(1994) found that macro-HQYLURQPHQWFRQGLWLRQVKDYHVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRQILUPV¶
financial status. Furthermore, the financial status of firms can be affect by the 
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change in the structure of financial market. During the 1980s, many developing 
countries have been trying to remove the restrictions on inner financial markets, 
leading to lower entry barriers for banking sector and stimulated the development 
of security market, which brings in more funds for investment. In addition, banks 
became trusted source of external finance and were believed to dominate informal 
financial markets. These all contribute to reducing the cost of external finance. 
Meanwhile, subsidized credit programmes were withdrawn and hence those firms 
who benefited from such programmes before may become financially constrained. 
Harris (1994), who studied Indonesia financial market, provided evidence of this. 
He found that the investment-cash flow sensitivity for smaller firms are less fierce 
after financial liberalization.  
 
2.4 Investment Models 
2.4.1 Neoclassical Model 
Although the assumption of MM theory is not satisfied in real life, it proves a basis 
for many other researches and theories. Hall and Jorgenson (1967) developed 
QHRFODVVLFDOPRGHORILQYHVWPHQWRQWKHIRXQGDWLRQRI00¶VZRUNLQWKHir paper of 
studying the relationship between tax policy and investment behaviour. They 
explained the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation in two ways, both 
of which are equivalent. One is that firms accumulate assets to supply their own 
invHVWPHQWVZKHUHWKHSXUSRVHLVWRPD[LPL]HWKHFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXH7KHRWKHULV
that firms rent assets from themselves or other firms, where the purpose is to 
maximize current profit. The regression model that reflects the relationship 
between tax policy and investment behaviour is derived from the second 
explanation. Although the relationship is not the interest of this paper, the 
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investment model should be discussed here. Their study concludes that the 
investment of a period equals to replacement investment of the capital stock at the 
beginning of the period plus any change in the desired level of capital stock in the 
past periods. The model is given as below: 
 
where It VWDQGVIRUWKHJURVVLQYHVWPHQWRISHULRGW.LVWKHFDSLWDOVWRFNƩ.+ is the 
change in desired capital stock, µs is an parameter indicating the change in desired 
capital stock for period (t-s)įVWDQGVIRUDFRQVWDQWSURSRUWLRQ (depreciation).  
 
The outcome is based on several important assumptions. Firstly, the objective of 
firms is to maximize their profit and the market is set to be perfect, for example, 
there is neither information cost nor taxation. Secondly, following a change in the 
desired level of assets, a certain percentage of subsequent investment is expended 
over each period. In addition, as a result of investment, a proportion of capital is 
replaced over each period. The scale of the proportion depends on different class of 
assets and is irrelevant to calendar time (Hall and Jorgenson 1967). 
 
Both MM theory and the finds of HalODQG-RUJHQVRQEHOLHYHWKDWFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDO
structure is irrelevant to investment decisions. The source of finance does not 
influence investment decisions. The research following neoclassical investment 
model during that period seems to dominate liquidity theory or internal funds 
theory, although there are some other researchers studying internal funds (for 
example Donaldson (1961) claimed that management generally favoured internal 
source of finance except for some occasions when fund was badly needed.) A 
noticeable paper of this is the one carried out by Jorgenson and Siebert (1968). The 
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paper compared four different investment models which are neoclassical, 
accelerator, expected profits and liquidity. Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) claimed 
that they had selected best lag distribution to keep the research unbiased from 
³PLVVSHFLILFDWLRQRI WKH ODJVVWUXFWXUHRU IURP LQDSSURSULDWHDVVXPSWLRQVDERXW
homogeneity of investment behaviour across firms (Jorgenson and Sirbert 1968, p. 
 ´7KH\IRXQGWKDWWKHQHoclassical theory, which gives better explanation of 
investment behaviour, is superior to other theories.  
 
However, Elliott (1973) showed opposite opinion against Jorgenson and Siebert. 
Following the study of Jorgenson and Siebert (1968), he tried to compare four 
investment models as well. He extended the sample size used in the research, 
enlarging to 184 firms which were selected from a variety of industries, instead of 
only 15 in Jorgenson and Siebert (1968). Elliott found that there was only small 
difference in the importance of neoclassical, accelerator, and liquidity model. The 
expected profits model is relatively unimportant compared with the other three. In 
addition, liquidity theory is found to be the most effective model while neoclassical 
theory is the least effective one, which was conflict to Jorgenson and Siebert. 
 
2.4.2 7RELQ¶V40RGHO 
In recent years, a new model that reflects the relationship of investment and 
internal funds has become the focus of financial researches, which is developed 
froP7RELQ¶V4PRGHO)D]]DUL+XEEDUGDQG3HWHUVHQILUVWO\FDUULHGRXWWKH
model in their research paper, which has been cited widely by the following studies. 
They believe that internal funds and external funds are not perfect substitutes. 
Otherwise, ILUP¶V FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH ZRXOG QRW DIIHFW LQYHVWPHQW GHFLVLRQV 7KH
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model is developed as follows: 
 
where I stands for the investment in assets of firm i at period t. X represent some 
variables that are used to control determinants of the investment. g is a function of 
cash flow (CF) which is used to measure the sensitivity of internal funds to 
investment. u is the error term. Fazzari et al HPSOR\HG7RELQ¶V4ZKLFKLVXVXDOO\
used to control the investment opportunities to represent determinants of the 
inYHVWPHQW;LQWKHUHJUHVVLRQPRGHO7RELQ¶V4ZDVQDPHGDIWHU-DPHV7RELQ
who was an American economist and was originally discussed in Brainard and Tobin 
(1968). All variables are divided by K which is the capital stock at the beginning of 
each period.  
 
To carry out the research, the measure of financial constraints must be considered. 
Fazzari et al chose retention rate to distinguish firms. According to the theoretical 
base that internal funds should be employed first, they argue that if a firm is 
financially constrained, it should choose to cut back dividend or rather not pay any 
dividend at all. Hence, high retention ratio (which means low dividend payment) 
reflects that firms are constrained. The more a company is constrained, the more 
significant influence cash flow (the indicator for internal funds) should have on the 
investment and the scale should be greater than less constrained ones. If the 
hypothesis stands, investment is more sensitive to cash flow for financially 
constrained firms. Using data from manufacturing industry, Fazzari et al proved 
their argument and found that cash flow had a strong positive effect on investment, 
which implied that internal capital did significantly affect the investment decision. 
In addition, the coefficient for firms with low dividend payment was higher than 
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that for high dividend firms, which meant constrained firms are more sensitive to 
internal funds than unconstrained ones. 
 
The findings of Fazzari et al¶V ZRUN LV ZLGHO\ DFFHSWHG DQG IROORZHG E\ RWKHU
researchers. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) gave strong support to Fazzari 
et al. They took Japanese firms as research target and divided the sample into two 
groups, one of which maintained a close relationship with banks and the other did 
not. The firms that had tight relationship with banks usually belong to a keiretsu. 
These firms were considered to be financially unconstrained and those independent 
ones were thus constrained. Hoshi et al found that keiretsu firms were less 
sensitive to internal funds than that of independent ones.  
 
However, their findings are challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The financial 
FRQVWUDLQWVXVHGLQ.DSODQDQG=LQJDOHV¶UHVHDUFKDUHGLIIHUHQW,QVWHDGRIUHWHQWLRQ
ratio, they try to record the investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms by reading the 
annual reports DQG PDQDJHPHQWV¶ SURVSHFW Dbout the future liquidity. Such 
information is integrated with quantitative data and public news to predict the 
availability of internal and external funds, as well as the future need for capital. 
Based on these researches, Kaplan and Zingales distinguish firms between 
constrained and unconstrained. The different definition of financial constraints 
gives completely opposite results against the findings of Fazzari et al (1988). 
Kaplan and Zingales conclude that less constrained firms are likely to experience 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Furthermore, they find that the 
relationship is non-monotonic. Therefore, they show strong disagreement to the 
findings of Fazzari et al (1988).  
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A similar approach is taken by Hovakimian (2009). He has accessed to firm-level 
information on the sensitivity of investment on cash flow, based on which he 
classify firms into high, low and negative sensitive groups of cash flow. For each of 
the group, he analyzes the possible factors that may determine the fierceness of 
financial constraints, including liquidity, growth rate, and investment and financial 
behaviour. Interestingly, although Hovakimian uses similar method as in Kaplan 
and Zingales, the findings seems to partially support Fazzari et al (1988). He finds 
that firms with positive investment-cash flow sensitivity face higher cost of external 
finance, which means greater financial constraints. A possible explanation could be 
that these firms are typically young and small, which makes them difficult to borrow 
loan from external resource. Additionally, these firms are more fragile on liquidity 
problem. The spending on investment may exceed the capacity for internal funds 
and hence the desire for external source is greater than those who are insensitive. 
 
The findings in Hovakimian (2009) are close to an earlier work which is completed 
by Alti (2003). The author analyzes investment-cash flow sensitivity in the 
benchmark case where financing is frictionless and concludes that young and small 
firms with high growth rate and low dividend payment are relatively higher in 
investment-FDVKIORZVHQVLWLYLW\,QVWHDGRIXVLQJ7RELQ¶V4PRGHO$OWLGHYHORSVDQ
LQYHVWPHQWPRGHO³EDVHGRQWKHVWDQGDUGQHRFOassical models of Lucas (1967), 
7UHDGZD\DQG+D\DVKL$OWLS ´+HEHOLHYHVWKDW7RELQ¶V
Q is noisy in measuring short-term investment of firms (see the discussion below).  
 
2.5 2WKHU:RUNV%DVHGRQ7RELQ¶V40RGHO 
Vogt (1994) studied the reason why cash flow is important to investment decision 
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by employing Q model. He proposes two hypothesises which are free cash flow 
hypothesis and pecking order hypothesis. If free cash flow hypothesis is able to 
explain investment-cash flow sensitivity, firms with low Q value should rely on cash 
flow to finance investment. By contrast, if pecking order theory can explain the 
relationship, firms with high Q should rely on cash flow to finance investment. The 
logic is that firms with excess free cash flow would invest in unprofitable projects to 
LQFUHDVHWKHPDQDJHUV¶ZHDOWKDJHQF\SUREOHPDVLQ-HQVHQ which will lead 
to low Q value, whereas firms driven by pecking order theory would give up good 
investment opportunities to avoid additional cost of external finance, where a high 
Q value will appear. Using data from 359 manufacturing firms over 1974 to 1990, 
KHILQGVWKDW³ODUJHORZ-dividend firms exhibit free cash flow behaviour, while small, 
low-dividend firms exhibit pecking RUGHUEHKDYLRXU9RJWS ´ 
 
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) tested the role of working capital in the reduced-form 
investment model. They claimed that cash flow might only indicate the demand for 
investment instead of a proxy for financial constraints. By contrast, working capital 
could avoid the confusion. If a firm was constrained, working capital and 
investment would compete against each other for scarce source. Hence working 
capital should have a negative coefficient in the conventional investment model, 
indicating any increasing in working capital would lead to decline in investment. The 
empirical results supported this prediction and showed that working capital was 
extremely sensitive to cash flow.  
 
There are many other empirical researches studying investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1991) have developed a more general Q 
model for monopoly firms, which allowed for adjustment for labour cost. Blundell et 
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al (1992) dropped cash flow from the conventional investment model and 
employed Q as the single explanation variable. They found that although the effect 
of Q is small on investment, the influence is significant. Kadapakkam, Kumar and 
Riddick (1998) shed light on the effect of firm size on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. They test data from six OECD countries and find that generally, the 
sensitivity is high in large size firm group but low in small size firm group. Lorenzoni 
DQG:DOHQWLQHPSKDVL]HWKHHIIHFWRILQVLGHUV¶LQIRUPDWLRQRQ7RELQ¶V4DQG
draw the conclusion that Q reflects a future quasi-rent that is taken by insiders, and 
thus creates a wedge between average Q and marginal Q. For more researches, one 
could also see Lamont (1997), Ericson and Whited (2000), and Carpenter, Fazzari 
and Petersen (1998).  
 
2.6 'LVFXVVLRQRI7RELQ¶V4 
Q theory of investment, which is described in detail in Brainard and Tobin (1968) 
and Tobin (1969), uses information from market to predict the future investment 
opportunity. In theory, marginal Q can be taken as one determinanW IRU ILUP¶V
investment. It measures the ratio of market value of an additional capital invested 
to the replacement cost (Hayashi 1982). If the ratio is greater than one, it will be 
beneficial for firms to make investment (Chirinko and Schaller 1995). However, as 
marginal Q is unobservable, empirical studies usually use average Q instead. It is 
defined as the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its capital stock. 
+D\DVKLSURYHGWKDWPDUJLQDO4DQGDYHUDJH4DUHHTXLYDOHQW³LIWKHILUP is 
a price-taker with constant returns to scale in both production and installation 
+D\DVKLS ´$GGLWLRQDOO\+D\DVKLDOVRLOOXVWUDWHGWKDWDYHUDJH4FRXOG
be higher than marginal Q if the firm is a price-maker.  
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A large number of researches have taken average Q as the measure of future 
investment opportunity. Chung and Pruitt (1994) present an approximate value of 
average Q which is: ܳ = ܯܸܧ+ܲܵ+ܦܧܤܶܶܣ           
where MVE means market value of equity which is equal to market share price 
multiplied by common shares outstanding, PS is the market value of preferred 
stock, DEBT is the value of short-term liability minus short-term assets plus 
long-term debt, and TA is the book value of total assets. However, this is believed 
not to be Q but a derivative of Q. 
 
As the condition for average Q to be equal to marginal Q is strict, taking average Q 
as the indicator of future investment opportunity could be problematic (Gugler, 
Mueller, and Yurtoglu 2004). They claim the higher the average Q is, the cheaper it 
should be for firms to raise funds and hence the less sensitive cash flow is to 
investment. Meanwhile, average Q is also used in their research to predict agency 
problem that a firm may suffer from. Unlike other empirical studies, they employ 
marginal Q to control the investment opportunity and average Q is used to control 
the above factors. The process to derive marginal Q lays on assumption of efficient 
market. In addition, predictable industry depreciation rate and industry-specific 
time shock (to control random shock) are also required. The final formula is given 
as follows: 
 
where qm stands for marginal Q, M is the market value of the firm, I represents the 
investment, įLVWKHLQGXVWULDOGHSUHFLDWLRQUDWHRQERWKWDQJLEOHDQGLQWDQJLEOH
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DVVHWVDQGıVWDQGVIRUWKHLQGXVWU\-specific time shock. Gugler et al (2004) state 
that when n is large enough, the last term is relatively too small to take into account 
and hence this formula provides an approximately measure of marginal Q. 
 
Carpenter and Guariglia (2003) claim that in the presence of information 
asymmetry, Q will onl\UHIOHFWWKHRXWVLGHUV¶HYDOXDWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\GXHWRWKH
information gap between insiders and outsiders. The investment-cash flow 
VHQVLWLYLW\PD\EHFDXVHGE\WKHLQVLGHUV¶HYDOXDWLRQRIRSSRUWXQLW\ZKLFKLVQRW
captured by Q. Therefore, they suggesWWRDGGDQHZSUR[\WRFDSWXUHWKHLQVLGHUV¶
YLHZ DERXW WKH IXWXUH RSSRUWXQLW\ ZKLFK LV QDPHG DV ³WKH ILUP¶V FRQWUDFWXDO
obligations for future new investment projects (Carpenter and Guariglia 2003, p. 
 ´,WLVWKHFRQWUDFWWRSXUFKDVHDVVHWLQWKHIXWure, for example machinery, land, 
DQG HTXLSPHQW 7KH LQIRUPDWLRQ LV REWDLQHG IURP FRPSDQLHV¶ DQQXDO UHSRUW
According to the contract, the firm has to make the purchase in the agreed future 
WLPHZKLFKPDNHVLWDSRVVLEOHSUR[\IRULQVLGHUV¶HYDOXDWLRQRIopportunity. By 
studying UK panel data, Carpenter and Guariglia (2003) find that the sensitivity for 
large firms are reduced after employing the new proxy but it is not changed for 
small ones. A similar procedure is followed by Bond et al (2004). They add one 
more proxy which is used to control expected future profit, and draw the conclusion 
that the coefficient for cash flow variable become insignificant. 
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CHAPTER ċ METHODOLOGY 
Based on the review of previous literature, this study tries to answer the following 
questions: 
(1) 'RHVWKHDYDLODELOLW\RILQWHUQDOILQDQFHDIIHFWILUPV¶LQYHVWPHQWEHKDYLRXU" 
(2) To what extent does internal finance affect investment levels of financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms? 
(3) Will different measurement of financial constraints affect the outcome?  
Test will be carried out based on four commonly used methods. Firstly, Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimator will be generated without considering time-specific 
and firm-specific effects. Secondly, fixed-effect (within) model and random-effects 
model will be used alternatively, taking time-specific and firm-specific influences 
into consideration. Furthermore, first-differencing transformation will be employed 
to transform the model to eliminate time-specific and firm±specific effects. Finally, 
instrumental variable with Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) will be employed 
to deal with endogenous problem. Results from each test will be compared.  
 
3.1 The Model  
To answer these questions, building a regression model is necessary. The standard 
empirical Q model assumes that firms choose to finance as much investment as 
they can, as long as they are able to pay the price of that finance. The only factor 
WKDWZLOODIIHFWILUPV¶GHFLVLRQLVWKHLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLW\%UDLQDUGDQG7RELQ
1968). The standard empirical Q model is formulated as: ܫtܭt = ܽ + 1ܾ ܳt + ߳t                 (1) 
where ܫt  is the gross investment, ܭt is the net capital stock, ܳt equals to (qt.- 1) 
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where qt  is marginal Q, ߳t is an error term or white noise, and a and b are 
structural parameters of adjustment cost function (Schiantarelli 1996). As marginal 
Q is unobservable, empirical studies usually use average Q instead, which is just 
the market value of fixed assets divided by book value of fixed assets or 
replacement capital. The replacement capital is the cost of fixed assets minus 
accumulated depreciation and amortization: ܤܸ = ሺ1 െ ߜሻܿ                 (2) 
where c is the cost of fixed assets and į is the accumulated depreciation rate. 
 
In this study, I will test average Q to capture the investment opportunity as 
+D\DVKL¶VFRQGLWLRQVGRnot hold in real life. Average Q will be introduced into the 
investment model which is developed by Fazzari et al (1988): 
ܫitܭit-1 = ߙ0 + ߙ1 ܥܨitܭit-1 + ߙ2 ܳit-1 + ߝit            (3) 
where ܫit stands for investment, ܥܨit (cash flow) is the indicator used to present 
internal finance, ܳit is the average Q, ܭit-1 is the capital stock at the beginning of 
the period t, and ߝit is an error term.  
 
To measure the variables in the above model, I will borrow the definition from 
Moyen (2004):  
 
Investment at time t = capital spent on purchasing fixed assets at time t 
 = [total gross property, plant and equipment at time 
t ± accumulated depreciation and amortization at 
time t] ± [total gross property, plant and 
equipment at time (t-1) ± accumulated 
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depreciation and amortization at time (t-1)] + 
depreciation and amortization at time t 
 
Capital stock at time t = total gross property, plant and equipment at time t 
- depreciation at time t 
 
Market value  = closing share price at end of fiscal year × common 
share outstanding + long-term debt 
 
Book value of fixed assets = total gross property, plant and equipment ± 
accumulated depreciation and amortization  
 
Cash flow at time t = income before extraordinary item + depreciation 
and amortization + deferred tax 
 
3.2 Solution to Question (1) 
After building the model, I will try to answer the first research question by OLS 
method as a starting point. To generate Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) 
from OLS, several assumptions must hold, which include multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Multicollinearity exists when there is 
strong linear relationship between independent variables. In the presence of 
multicollinearity, it is difficult to assess the individual impact of independent 
variables on dependent variable, in this study, cash flow on investment. Although 
the estimator is still BLUE, OLS estimators will have large variance. Additionally, the 
estimator may tend to be insignificant even if actually it is. There are several ways 
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to detect the problem, such as extraordinary high R-squared value, high Variance 
Inflating Factor (VIF, if greater than 10) or low tolerance value (if smaller than 0.1). 
Secondly, heteroscedasticity should be tested. The problem is caused by inconstant 
error term which varies with independent variable. If heteroscedasticity exists, the 
estimator is linear, unbiased and consistent, but not efficient (Wooldridge 2008). 
The reported P-value should not be trusted. Scatter diagram between fitted value of 
independent variable and square of residuals can be used to detect 
heteroscedasticity. Alternatively, Breusch-Pagan test or White test is also suitable 
for this purpose. Finally, serial correlation occurs when the error term is not 
independent over time, for example, the error term of this period may be correlated 
with that of the last. The problem will lead to inefficient estimator and inappropriate 
p-value. In this study, I will use the method developed by Wooldridge (2002) to 
detect this error. All of these problems will affect the accuracy of the result, hence 
must be handled with care. 
 
It is arguable from recent literature that using OLS is not appropriate, even if all the 
assumptions are binding. The simple regression model (3) does not concern 
firm-specific and time-specific effect, for example new technology or major 
economical environment change. Studies usually involve firm and time dummies to 
reflect such effects. In econometrics, the firm-specific effect is called firm 
heterogeneity. If the heterogeneity term is correlated with the independent 
variables, fixed-effect model, which is also called Least Squares Dummy Variables 
Model, is more efficient than random-effect model. OLS procedure will be sufficient 
to predict the coefficients for the variables. However, if the heterogeneity term is 
not correlated with the independent variables, one should use random-effect model 
and instead of OLS, GLS (Generalised Least Squares) is a better estimator. To 
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decide which model to use, I follow Hausman test to choose between the models. 
The null hypothesis for Hausman test is that random-effect model is appropriate. 
From business common sense, I believe the heterogeneity term is correlated with 
the independent variables hence I expect the test to reject the null hypothesis and 
prefer fixed-effect model.  
 
Another common way to withdraw heterogeneity term is to transform the model. 
By transforming, firm heterogeneity term and time dummy is dropped out of the 
model, which eliminates the potential influence of the two. There are several 
methods to do so, such as within transformation and first-differencing 
transformation, where first-differencing is essentially to deal with the dynamic 
nature of the investment model. In this research, I will transform the model by 
first-differencing. The model is developed as: 
ܫitܭit-1 = ߙ0 + ߙ1 ܥܨitܭit-1 + ߙ2 ܳit-1 + ߙ3݂i + ߝit          (4) 
where ݂i  is the firm heterogeneity term. 
 
The logic of first-differencing is explained here. It requires lagging model (4) by one 
period, which becomes: 
ܫit-1ܭit-2 = ߙ0 + ߙ1 ܥܨit-1ܭit-2 + ߙ2 ܳit-2 + ߙ3݂i + ߝit-1          (5) 
Then subtract (5) from (4), the transformed model becomes: ൬ ܫit
 ܭit-1 െ ܫit-1ܭit-2൰ = ߙ1 ൬ܥܨitܭit-1 െ ܥܨit-1ܭit-2 ൰ + ߙ2൫ܳit-1 െ ܳit-2൯ +  (ߝit െ ߝit-1)     (6) 
As the firm heterogeneity is same for each period, it is subtracted from model (6).  
Test will be carried out based on equation (6) to see the influence of cash flow on 
investment after controlling firm-specific effects. The results will be compared with 
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the above OLS estimators. It is noticed that the error term is serially correlated. 
However, most econometric software packages can adjust this error.  
 
Finally, instrumental variables are employed to test the influence of cash flow on 
investment. Several studies have found that lagged investment rate also 
significantly affect investment decisions (see Guiso and Parigi 1999, Ghosal and 
Loungani 2000). I hence add investment rate lagged one period into equation (5) 
and derive: 
ܫitܭit-1 = ߙ0 + ߙ1 ܥܨitܭit-1 + ߙ2 ܳit-1 + ߙ3݂i + ߙ4 ܫit-1ܭit-2 + ߝit          (7) 
Equation (7) is a dynamic model. Similar to the derivation of equation (6), the firm 
heterogeneity term can be eliminated by first-differencing transformation. The 
transformed model is: 
 (
ܫitܭit-1 െ ܫit-1ܭit-2) = ߙ1 ቀܥܨitܭit-1 െ ܥܨit-1ܭit-2 ቁ + ߙ2൫ܳit-1 െ ܳit-2൯ +  ߙ4 ቀ ܫit-1ܭit-2 െ ܫit-2ܭit-3ቁ + (ߝit െ ߝit-1) (8) 
or: ο ቀ ܫitܭit-1ቁ = ߙ1ο ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁ +  ߙ2οܳit-1 + ߙ4ο൬ ܫit-1ܭit-2൰ + οߝit       (9) 
Although firm heterogeneity term is eliminated, there is new problem with equation 
(8) and (9). ο ൬ ܫit-1ܭit-2൰ and  οߝit  is now correlated, which in other words, there is 
endogenous problem. To prove this, as ο ൬ ܫit-1ܭit-2൰ = ܫit-1ܭit-2 െ ܫit-2ܭit-3 , οߝit = ൫ߝit െ ߝit-1൯, and 
from equation (5), it is clear that ο ൬ ܫit-1ܭit-1൰ and οߝit  both contain ߝit-1, thus they 
must be correlated. 
 
When endogenous problem occurs, OLS is not suitable because the estimator will 
be biased and inconsistent. An alternative method is to use instrumental variables 
 33 
 
(IV). By employing IV, endogeneity bias is controlled for by instrumenting the 
regressors (Arellano and Bond 1991). As the model is dynamic, I choose 
investment rate lagged two and three periods to be IV, which is 
ܫit-2ܭit-3 and ܫit-3ܭit-4. It will 
be first-differenced and run by GMM. The model to be tested is equation (7). The 
estimator ߙ1,ߙ2,ߙ4 should be BLUE. The results will be compared with that from 
OLS, fixed-effect model and first-differencing transformation. 
 
There are three important tests for the validity of IV. Firstly, the instrumental 
variable should not be part of the regression model. Neither 
ܫit-2ܭit-3  nor ܫit-3ܭit-4  is 
included in equation (7), which satisfies the requirement. Secondly, the 
instrumental variable should be correlated with the endogenous variable. If not, the 
instruments are called weak instruments and will bias the IV estimator. In this case, ο ቀ ܫit-1ܭit-2ቁ is clearly correlated with ܫit-2ܭit-3. It is easy to prove that ο ቀ ܫit-1ܭit-2ቁ is correlated 
with 
ܫit-3ܭit-4 as well. Lastly, instrumental variable should not be correlated with error 
term. Neither 
ܫit-2ܭit-3  nor ܫit-3ܭit-4  is correlated with οߝit . As ܫit-2ܭit-3 = ߙ0 + ߙ1 ܥܨit-2ܭit-3 +ߙ2 ܳit-2 + ߙ3݂i + ߙ4 ܫit-3ܭit-4 + ߝit-2, whereas οߝit = ൫ߝit െ ߝit-1൯ . They have nothing in 
common. The same applies to 
ܫit-3ܭit-4.    
 
,Q HPSLULFDO VWXGLHV +DQVHQ¶V --test is usually used to test the instruments 
exogeneity. It is also called the test for overidentifying restrictions with a null 
hypothesis that all instruments are valid. The test statistics will have a chi-squared 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of surplus instruments. In 
this research, the J-test should have one degree of freedom. 
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3.3 Solution to Question (2) and (3) 
After discussing the general effect of cash flow on investment, I will move forward 
to study the difference between financial constrained and unconstrained firms. 
There are many indicators been used to split the sample into constrained and 
unconstrained groups. I will firstly test the most popular ones which are dividend 
payment and firm size. Then I will interact the two criterions together, as 
Schiantarelli (1996) claimed that using one criterion to group companies might not 
be sufficient. 
 
To analyze cash flow effect on investment by classifying firms by dividend payment, 
I will add a slope dummy variable in equation (7) to interact with cash flow: 
ܫitܭit-1 = ߙ0 + ߙ1 ܥܨitܭit-1 + ߙ2 ܳit-1 + ߙ3݂i + ߙ4 ܫit-1ܭit-2 + ߙ5[ܦdiv × ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁ] + ߝit    (10) 
where ܦdiv is the dummy variable for dividend. Dividend payment is divided by 
capital stock at the beginning of each period for deflating purpose, named dividend 
rate. ܦdiv is defined as 1 if the dividend rate is higher than average, while 0 
otherwise. In other words, following the argument from Fazzari et al (1988), 
unconstrained firms are the ones who pay higher dividend and hence labelled 1. By 
contrast, constrained firms are the ones labelled 0. From equation (10), it is clear 
that cash flow effect on investment for unconstrained firms is (ߙ1 + ߙ5) whereas 
constrained firms is just ߙ1. If Fazzari HWDO¶s theory is valid, I expect ߙ5 to be 
negative and statistically significant. 
  
After discussing dividend payment criterion, I will split the sample by firm size. 
There are several figures popular to define firm size. I will borrow the determinants 
from Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick (1998). They used market value of equity, 
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total assets, and sales as indicators for firm size. For simplicity, I will use total 
assets and sales to separate firms only. Similar to the analysis for dividend criterion, 
I divide the two by capital stock at beginning of each period and name them total 
assets rate and sales rate respectively. Dummy variables are created to present the 
effect of firm size. The dummy variable is also interacted with cash flow: 
ܫitܭit-1 = ߙ0 + ߙ1 ܥܨitܭit-1 + ߙ2 ܳit-1 + ߙ3݂i + ߙ4 ܫit-1ܭit-2 + ߙ5[ܦta × ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁ] + ߝit    (11) 
where ܦta   is the dummy variable for total assets, which in the subsequent 
analysis will be replaced by ܦts, the dummy variable created for sales. Both of the 
dummy variables are given the value 1 if the subject they stand for is higher than 
average. It is commonly believed that small firms are relatively more constrained to 
external finance, which means small firms are more sensitive. Hence I would 
expect the coefficient for ߙ5 to be negative and statistically significant, regardless 
whether firm size is measured by total assets or sales. 
 
Following the test of firm size criterion, I will interact dividend with firm size to test 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity. The dividend dummy will be multiplied by firm 
size dummy. The meaning for different combination is presented in the following 
matrix (Table 3.1). All the dummy variables are as defined above. 
 
Table 3.1 Matrix for Dividend and Firm Size Dummy 
 Dividend Dummy 
0 1 
Firm Size Dummy 0 Small firms paying 
low dividend 
Small firms paying 
high dividend 
1 Large firms paying 
low dividend 
Large firms paying 
high dividend 
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Equation (12) will be tested to reveal the interactive effect of dividend and firm size. 
In theory, small firms paying low dividend should be the most constrained firms. By 
contrast, large firms paying high dividend are considered to be most unconstrained. 
Therefore, small firms paying low dividend is expected to be most sensitive and 
large firms paying high dividend should be least sensitive. The other two 
combinations may lie in the middle.  ܫitܭit-1 = ߙ0 + ߙ1 ܥܨitܭit-1 + ߙ2 ܳit-1 + ߙ3݂i + ߙ4 ܫit-1ܭit-2 + ߙ5 ቂܦdiv × ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁቃ + ߙ6 ቂܦta ×ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁቃ + ߙ7 ቂܦdiv × ܦta × ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁቃ + ߝit              (12) 
 
All the above equations, (10) (11) and (12), will be carried out by GMM with 
instrumental variable of 
ܫitܭit-1 lagged two and three periods. Schiantarelli (1996) 
claimed that investment and dividend or firm size could be endogenous, for which 
instrumental variables should be utilized. In addition, for comparison, I will also 
employ fixed-effect model to test equation (4) after adding in each dummy variable 
separately as well as the interactive dummy. The reason of not choose 
first-differencing transformation is that all variables will be first differenced in GMM. 
Hence, these two methods may reveal similar outcome. The results for each 
splitting criterion will be compared.  
 
Finally, Moyen (2004) suggests interpreting mean and correlation between 
variables to explain the difference between constrained and unconstrained firms. 
She conducts correlation matrix for constrained and unconstrained firms separately. 
I will follow the same pattern to generate correlation matrix for the selected sample. 
I expect the findings from this to support the outcome from the above analysis. 
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CHAPTER Č DATA AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Data Collection and Description 
Panel data is believed to be suitable for the study. Hsiao (2006) concludes several 
advantages of panel data. As panel data contains more degree of freedom and 
variables, it can generate estimators which are more accurate. In addition, panel 
data has better control over omitted variables, which may significantly influence 
the outcome. In studies of dynamic models, panel data allows researchers to 
reduce collinearity between current and lagged values. Furthermore, panel data is 
helpful to simplify the computation and statistical inference in some cases, for 
example, reducing measurement error by transforming.  
 
Following Moyen (2004) and Cleary (1999), I take the sample data from 
manufacturing industry with Standard Industry Code (SIC) from 2000 to 3999. 
Data is retrieved from COMPUSTAT North America database. The sample period is 
set to be the most recent 10 years which is from 1999 to 2008. I choose the firms 
reporting financial statements on consolidated level with US dollar as the reporting 
currency. Besides, firms have to be active through the whole sample period. Firms 
from financial service side are excluded from the sample due to the complexity of 
their financial statements. Originally, there are 2,763 firms forming 26,180 
firm-year observations. Unfortunately, not every company has full information 
through the 10 years. In order to make the research as accurate as possible, I 
delete all the firms who do not report total assets, investments, or cash flow, as well 
as those with a large amount of missing values. The sample size is finally reduced 
to 2,233 companies with 20,511 firm-year observations. The sample is unbalanced 
with the observed years varying for each company from 4 to 10 years. Table 4.1 
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reports the descriptive data of the main items used in the research. 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Data of Raw Material 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
CAPX       20,511 149.9754 1,036.18   -.105 40,595.29 
IBC          20,511 139.6217   1,136.959 -24,474 45,220 
DPC          20,511 126.9381 768.7119 0 44,667 
TXDC        20,511 -0.5187 115.5974   -5,477 4,283 
CSHO        20,511 117.9997    492.2261 .001 23,177.63 
PRCC_F 20,511 15.57192 25.68142 .0001 983.02 
DLTT 20,511   515.6103 3,565.487 0 191,133 
PPENT 20,511 801.2666 4,976.061 0 121,346 
DV           20,511 56.94581 379.1149   -.042 10,342 
AT 20,511 2,762.345   14,399.66 0 448,507 
SALE          20,511 2,436.452 13,041.14 -.234 425,071 
 
From the data manual provided by COMPUSTAT, capital expenditure is defined as 
the capital invested in acquiring additional fixed assets (property, plant and 
equipment), which in this research is employed as investment ( ܫit). I create 
cashflow to capture cash flows of firms, which is the sum of IBC, DPC and TXDC. 
The market value of average Q is derived as CSHO multiplied by PRCC_F and then 
plus long-term debt (DLTT). All items are divided by ܭt-1 which is the capital stock 
at the beginning of the period to generate the variables in equation (3). The 
descriptive data of these variables are summarized in Table 4.2. Due to some 
missing values left in the above items, the observations are reduced to 16,921.  
 
It is clear that some statistics are out of normal range, for example, negative 
investment rate. I believe this is caused by extreme values or outliers effect. 
Therefore, I process the extreme values or outliers for relevant variables by 
winsorizing the data. I follow the process in Moyen (2004) and Cleary (1999): 
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7RELQ¶V4EHWZHHQDQG INV between 0 and 2, CF between -5 and 5. One 
advantage of winsorizing is that it keeps observations in the sample, as well as 
information about high and low errors (Armstrong and Collopy 1992, Stoltzfus and 
Epps 2005). Winsorizing is widely used in panel data research to control the effect 
of outliers (see Bond et al 2003, Cummins et al 1999). I report the winsorized 
statistics in Table 4.3 below. In the following research, winsorized dataset is used 
instead of the original data. The winsorized dataset is better compared with that in 
Table 4.2 without reducing the number of observations. 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Data of Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
INV               16,921 .9576248 30.09751 -.2644836 2924 
CF      16,921 -15.82232 213.6293 -12231.5 11913 
Q                  16,921 162.9293 2327.544 .000934 226660 
where INV = 
ܫitܭit-1 , CF = ܥܨitܭit-1 , Q is the average q at the beginning of the period.  
 
Table 4.3 Winsorized Data of Variables. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
INV               20,511 .6218846 .7380411 0 2 
CF      20,511    .425159 3.0531 -5 5 
Q                  20,511 7.478116 3.373605 .000934 10 
where INV = 
ܫitܭit-1 , CF = ܥܨitܭit-1 , Q is the average q at the beginning of the period.  
 
4.2 Data Analysis 
4.2.1 Answer to Question (1) 
As a starting point, I run equation (3) without considering time-specific and 
firm-specific effects. The regression model gives the following relationship between 
investment and cash flow, reported in Table 4.4. Cash flow has positive effect on 
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investment rate (0.121), indicating higher cash flow leads to higher investment 
rate, or increase in internal capital will encourage firms to invest more in fixed 
assets, ceteris paribus. The figure is considered to be significant at 5% significance 
level (with p-value less than 0.1). Q is found to be positively and significantly affect 
investment as well (0.088) with a p-value less than 0.1. The goodness-of-fit for the 
model is also reasonable, with an R-squared of 0.4651. 
 
Table 4.4 OLS Results 
 Coef. Std. err P-value Std. err robust P-value 
CF .1214746 .0012449 0.000 .0015914 0.000 
Q .0877112 .0011267 0.000 .0008871 0.000 
_cons -.0856756 .009183 0.000 .0043605 0.000 
 
It is essential to test the assumptions for OLS in order to generate BLUE estimators. 
I test multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity respectively. I found no evidence for 
multicollinearity (VIF less than 10 and no correlation of variables higher than 0.75). 
However, heteroscedasticity is found to present (p-value of White test well below 
0.01 level). When heteroscedasticity problem is presented, the estimation is not 
efficient which gives wrong standard error, although the coefficients are still linear 
and unbiased. I correct the problem by robust the regression model in STATA. The 
standard error after robust is reported in Table 4.4. It is clear that the standard 
errors are different.  
 
Considering the time-specific and firm-specific effect on the investment model, I 
further analyze equation (4) which contains heterogeneity term. Both fixed-effect 
and random-effect models can be used to eliminate the heterogeneity term. As 
expected, the magnitude of outcome for each model is dissimilar. As shown in Table 
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4.5, fixed-effect model reports greater influence of cash flow on investment rate 
(0.157 to 0.145). However, Q presents the opposite outcome. Random-effect 
model estimates Q as more influential on investment rate (0.0923 to 0.091). All 
statistics reported are significant at 5% significance level.  
 
Table 4.5 Fixed-effect and Random-effect Results 
 Fixed-effect  Random-effect 
CF .1565072 
(.0013759) 
[0.000] 
.1450516 
(.0012573) 
[0.000] 
Q .0905597 
(.0015525) 
[0.000] 
.0922503 
(.0013119) 
[0.000] 
_cons -.1218717 
(.0118449) 
[0.000] 
-.0935973 
(.0116485) 
[0.000] 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
Additionally, it is worth paying attention to the F statistics reported by fixed-effect 
model. F statistics determines whether it is appropriate to use fixed-effect model. 
The null hypothesis for the test is that pooled model (as the above analysis of OLS 
estimator) is appropriate thus it is not necessary to use fixed-effect model. Simple 
OLS would be sufficient. In the research, F statistics suggests to reject the null 
hypothesis and prefer fixed-effect model. Similarly, the test between pooled model 
and random-effect model give preference to random-effect model (see the 
statistics in Appendix). The problem here is to decide which model to believe. In 
theory, if the heterogeneity item is correlated with the independent variables, 
fixed-effect model should be preferred. Hausman test is suitable for the model 
selection. The null hypothesis for Hausman test is that independent variables and 
 42 
 
heterogeneity are not correlated. In other words, if null hypothesis is not rejected, 
one should use random-effect model. From the test statistics given by STATA, I 
reject the null hypothesis (prob > chi2 = 0.000) and prefer fixed-effect model. 
Comparing with the pooled model, fixed-effect model reports greater effect of cash 
flow on investment rate (0.157 to 0.121). An implication for this is that after 
controlling time-specific and firm-specific effects, internal finance even significantly 
affects the investment decisions made by firms to greater extent. 
 
After testing equation (4) by fixed-effect and random-effect models, I move 
forward to the third test technique which is first-differencing transformation. By 
first-differencing transformation, the heterogeneity term can be eliminated as well. 
It is noticeable that after first-differencing, the constant item is dropped from the 
model. In addition, serial correlation should be tested in order not to influence the 
coefficients estimated. I use :RROGULGJH¶V PHWKRG WR WHVW SDQHO GDWD VHULDO
correlation (command xtserial in STATA). The null hypothesis is that there is no 
first-order autocorrelation. The test statistic rejects the null and concludes that 
autocorrelation problem exists. In order to generate BLUE estimator, I employ 
cluster to correct autocorrelation and noc to represent the absence of constant item. 
The result is reported in Table 4.6. Cash flow is estimated to have positive effect on 
investment with the value 0.133, which is smaller than the coefficient from 
fixed-effect model but greater than simple OLS. Q is reported to have positive effect 
on investment as well, which is the same as previous tests, while the magnitude is 
greater (0.101 compared with 0.088 from OLS and 0.091 from fixed-effect). All the 
coefficients are statistically significant. Compared with simple OLS, the prediction 
power is a little stronger for first-differencing transformed model, with an 
R-squared value of 0.4984.  
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Table 4.6 First-differencing Transformation Results 
 Coef. Std. err robust P-value 
D1.CF .1328339 .002903 0.000 
D1.Q .1013758 .0019443 0.000 
D1 means the variable is first differenced by itself lagged one period. 
 
Finally, I test the investment-cash flow sensitivity by employing instrumental 
variable and GMM method. A reason for testing dynamic model using GMM is that it 
is concerned the change in current cash flow may not only affect current investment 
decisions, but also the decisions for the future. The dynamic model tested for this 
purpose is equation (7). Although dynamic panel data model allows researchers to 
create instrumental variables without requiring new data, the more instrumental 
variables generated, the more observations are lost. In addition, too many 
instrumental variables may bias GMM in small samples (Hill, Griffiths, and Lim 
2008). Therefore, two instrumental variables which are INV lagged two and three 
periods are chosen. In order to utilize the instrumental variable, the chosen IV must 
be valid. The test statistics are reported in Appendix. Furthermore, there is one 
important assumption for IV to be valid, which is that the error term is not serially 
correlated. However, Wooldridge test shows that serial correlation does exist for the 
model. I hence use cluster command in STATA to correct the problem. Similar to 
first-differencing transformation, the constant item is eliminated from the model. 
The investment-cash flow relationship is reported in Table 4.7. 
 
GMM reveals much smaller effect of cash flow on investment than first-differencing 
transformation with a value of 0.038. The p-value shows that the influence is 
significant. Q is estimated to have weaker positive effect on investment than 
reported by first-differencing transformation. The magnitude is 0.048 compared to 
0.101. The p-value demonstrates that Q is statistically significant as well. 
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Furthermore, GMM also tests the effect of lagged investment rate. It reveals a 
significant strong positive effect (0.208) on current investment decision. The test 
VWDWLVWLFVIRURYHULGHQWLI\LQJUHVWULFWLRQV+DQVHQ¶V-SUHIHUWKHQXOOK\SRWKHVLVWKDW
all instruments are valid with chi-squared distribution of one degree of freedom and 
a p-value of 0.3543. The F statistic which is used to test weak instruments suggests 
no such error with a value of 13.85.  
 
Table 4.7 GMM Results 
 Coef. Std. err robust P-value 
D1.CF .0379426 .0057217 0.000 
D1.Q .0483893 .0028439 0.000 
LD.INV .207658 .0236257 0.000 
D1 means the variable is first differenced by itself lagged one period. LD means lagged INV 
is first differenced. 
 
For comparison, I gather the results from each test and export that in Table 4.8. All 
the tests carried out reveal positive effect of cash flow on investment rate. 
Fixed-effect model gives the highest estimation of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
at a value of 0.157. First-differencing transformation follows fixed-effect model 
with a value of 0.133. OLS estimation is 8.5% lower than first-differencing 
transformation. GMM reveals the lowest value of only 0.038. The most influential 
factor predicted by GMM is the lagged investment rate, reaching 0.208. Meanwhile, 
Q is found to positively affect investment as well, but with divergent magnitude. 
First-differencing transformation shows the highest effect. OLS and fixed-effect 
report middle range of effect whereas GMM exhibits lowest effect of Q. All the 
coefficients are strongly significant at 95% confidence interval. 
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Table 4.8 Comparison of Four Test Techniques 
 OLS Fixed-effect First-differencing GMM 
CF .1214746 
(.0015914) 
[0.000] 
.1565072 
(.0013759) 
[0.000] 
.1328339 
(.002903) 
[0.000] 
.0379426 
(.0057217) 
[0.000] 
Q .0877112 
(.0008871) 
[0.000] 
.0905597 
(.0015525) 
[0.000] 
.1013758 
(.0019443) 
[0.000] 
.0483893 
(.0028439) 
[0.000] 
LD.INV    .207658 
(.0236257) 
[0.000] 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
4.2.2 Answer to Question (2) and (3) 
To study the difference of investment-cash flow sensitivity between constrained 
and unconstrained firms, I first use dividend as the criterion to split the sample. 
Similar to the processing of other variables, dividend rate is winsorized between 0 
and 5. The mean for dividend rate is 0.162. In STATA, I create a dummy variable 
DIV to refer to dividend payment and 0 is defined as constrained (ܦdiv in equation 
(10)). Company is given the value 0 if dividend rate is lower than average. The 
dummy variable is interacted with CF to estimate the effect on investment (DIV_CF 
in STATA and ܦdiv × ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁ in equation (10)). The regression model to be run for this 
purpose is equation (10). I employ fixed-effect and IV/GMM to estimate the model. 
The results are reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9 Regression Results with Financial Constraints 
 Dividend as financial constraint Total assets as financial constraint Sales as financial constraint 
Fixed-effect GMM Fixed-effect GMM Fixed-effect GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CF .1544544 
(.0014208) 
[0.000] 
.0263583 
(.0054289) 
[0.000] 
.2232757 
(.0024305) 
[0.000] 
.0228591 
(.0120641) 
[0.058] 
.1731248 
(.0018419) 
[0.000] 
.0311136 
(.0089249) 
[0.000] 
Q .0906324 
(.0015512) 
[0.000] 
.0469957 
(.0027335) 
[0.000] 
.0718012 
(.0016115) 
[0.000] 
.0488345 
(.0028803) 
[0.000] 
.0885186 
(.001552) 
[0.000] 
.0482607 
(.0028293) 
[0.000] 
DIV_CF .024833 
(.0043461) 
[0.000] 
.0886919 
(.0085089) 
[0.000] 
    
DTA_CF   -.0898046 
(.0027312) 
[0.000] 
.0172131 
(.011439) 
[0.132] 
  
DTS_CF     -.0330957 
(.0024545) 
[0.000] 
.0093374 
(.0082895) 
[0.260] 
LD.INV  .1942064 
(.02285) 
[0.000] 
 .2066552 
(.0236452) 
[0.000] 
 .2055418 
(.2055418) 
[0.000] 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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Column (1) and (2) in Table 4.9 show the results from fixed-effect model and GMM 
respectively. The two techniques reveal dissimilar magnitude of sensitivity of cash 
flow on investment (0.154 to 0.026). The values are both positive and consistent 
with previous tests. It is worth noticing that this value is the sensitivity for 
constrained firms, where dividend dummy is set zero. From Fazzari et al¶VSRLQWRI
view, unconstrained firms should be less sensitive which implies that dividend 
dummy should be negative. However, adverse results are found against Fazzari et 
al. As 1 stands for unconstrained firms in the dividend dummy, positive estimations 
of Ddiv_cf add value to the coefficient of CF. Unconstrained firms are found to be 
more sensitive than constrained ones by both fixed-effect and GMM techniques 
(0.179 from fixed-effect and 0.115 from GMM). Possible explanation is given in 
Moyen (2004). She claims that both constrained and unconstrained firms make 
investment when there is opportunity. Unconstrained firms even raise debt to 
finance the investment. However, the effect of debt financing is not captured by the 
investment model. It hence magnifies the investment-cash flow sensitivity of 
unconstrained firms. Moving forward to Q, fixed-effect model reports higher 
coefficient for Q than GMM (0.091 to 0.047). Lagged investment rate is again found 
positively affect current investment, although the magnitude is smaller than 
previous tests.  
 
The prerequisite for fixed-effect model and GMM are tested as well. The F test for 
model choice prefers fixed-effect model than pooled model. Hence the coefficients 
from fixed-effect model are credible. In addition, the instrumental variables in GMM 
are found valid with 0.3525 p-value for J-test. There is no evidence for weak 
instrument and all the instrumental variables are significant. 
 
Secondly, I will test the model by dividing the sample according to firm size. Two 
criterions are employed which are total assets and sales. Both of them are 
winsorized between 0 and 10 to avoid outlier effect. Similar to the process for 
dividend rate, I calculate the mean for total assets rate and sales rate. Companies 
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are considered as small if the total assets rate or sales rate are lower than average. 
Small firms are valued 0 in the dummy variable (DTA and DTS), which is then 
interacted with cash flow (DTA_CF and DTS_CF in STATA). Fixed-effect model and 
GMM are used sequentially. The results are shown in columns (3) to (6) in Table 4.9. 
 
When employing total assets as the splitting criterion, some consistent results 
present, but also some ones different from dividend criterion. Positive sensitivity is 
found to constrained firms both by fixed-effect and GMM (0.223 and 0.023 
respectively). Q is also reported to positively affecting investment (0.072 and 
0.049). Considering unconstrained firms, two different techniques reveal different 
results. Fixed-effect model reports lower sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
(0.133), which supports Fazzari HWDO¶s argument that unconstrained firms are less 
sensitive. The result is reported as significant. By contrast, GMM reports that 
unconstrained firms are more constrained at a value of 0.040. Although this is 
consistent with the findings on dividend, the figure is found statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, GMM result should not be believed. Therefore, constrained firms are 
found more sensitive than unconstrained ones if the sample is split by total assets. 
All the prerequisites for instruments are tested and no deniable evidence is found.  
 
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 4.9 shows the sensitivity when using sales as the 
criterion to separate firms. Identical to previous researches, both fixed-effect 
model and GMM give positive effect of cash flow on investment for constrained 
firms (0.173 and 0.031 respectively), the same for Q (0.089 and 0.048). For 
unconstrained firms, fixed-effect and GMM again, reveal different results. Similar to 
the test on total assets, fixed-effect estimate unconstrained firms to be less 
sensitive with a value of 0.140. By contrary, GMM gives higher sensitivity level to 
unconstrained firms (0.040). In other words, fixed-effect model supports Fazzari et 
DO¶VILQGLQJVZKLOH*00SUHIHUV.DSODQDQG=LQJDOHV¶. However, it is noticed that the 
dummy variable is insignificant in GMM once again. Besides, all the other 
coefficients are found significant. The lagged investment rate is robust and 
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consistent with previous tests. Lastly, the prerequisites for instruments are tested 
and all of the instruments are valid. 
 
Furthermore, I try to split the sample by interacting two dummy variables. DX1 is 
created to represent the interactive dummy of dividend and total assets multiplied 
by CF [ܦdiv × ܦta × ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁ], and DX2 stands for dividend and sales dummy multiplied 
by CF [ܦdiv × ܦts × ቀܥܨitܭit-1ቁ]. The results are reported in Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10 Regression Results by Interactive Dummy Variable 
 Dividend and Total Assets 
Interacted 
Dividend and Sales Interacted 
Fixed-effect GMM Fixed-effect GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CF .2211761 
(.0024575) 
[0.000] 
.0191146 
(.0118968) 
[0.108] 
.1715116 
(.0018625) 
[0.000] 
.0306848 
(.008827) 
[0.001] 
Q .0713408 
(.0016083) 
[0.000] 
.0471591 
(.0027763) 
[0.000] 
.0884047 
(.001549) 
[0.000] 
.0470208 
(.0027306) 
[0.000] 
DDIV_CF .0684141 
(.010546) 
[0.000] 
.0912642 
(.0089055) 
[0.000] 
.0529573 
(.0095066) 
[0.000] 
.062415 
(.0397653) 
[0.117] 
DTA_CF -.0915262 
(.0028058) 
[0.000] 
.0083576 
(.0114163) 
[0.464] 
  
DTS_CF   -.0358918 
(.0025586) 
[0.000] 
-.0065572 
(.0087925) 
[0.456] 
DX1 -.0308336 
(.0113938) 
[0.007] 
-.0078749 
(.0050378) 
[0.118] 
  
DX2   -.0201455 
(.0106048) 
[0.057] 
.0307786 
(.0407359) 
[0.450] 
LD.INV  .1879015 
(.1879015) 
[0.000] 
 .1942904 
(.0229453) 
[0.000] 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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The finding from the last test is interesting. For columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.10, 
Q is found to be positive and significant by both techniques. Additionally, both of the 
models give positive effect of cash flow on investment for most constrained firms 
(small and low dividend payment). Similar to previous tests, fixed-effect model 
reports greater sensitivity level than GMM (0.221 to 0.019). However, cash flow is 
found insignificant by GMM. Nevertheless, this test contains more information. 
Firms are grouped into four categories, which are small firms paying low dividend, 
small firms paying high dividend, large firms paying low dividend, and large firms 
paying high dividend. For each type, the sensitivity is found different (see Table 
4.11). 
 
Table 4.11 Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity for Four Firm Categories 
 dividend and total assets 
interacted 
dividend and sales interacted 
Fixed-effect 
model 
GMM Fixed-effect 
model 
GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Small 
firms 
paying low 
dividend 
.2211761 
 
.0191146γ 
 
.1715116 
 
.0306848 
 
Small 
firms 
paying 
high 
dividend 
.2895902  .0912642 
 
.2244689 .0930998γ 
large 
firms 
paying low 
dividend 
.1296499 .0274722γ .1356198 .0241276γ 
large 
firms 
paying 
high 
dividend 
.159728 .1108615γ .1684316 .1173212γ 
γ stands for insignificant value at 5% significance level. 
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For the first column in table 4.11, the reports from fixed-effect model show that the 
most sensitive firms come from relatively constrained category with a coefficient of 
0.290, while the least sensitive firms are from the same category, large firms with 
low dividend payment (0.130). Firms who pay high dividend are estimated more 
sensitive, regardless of firm size. For firms paying similar level of dividend (high or 
low), small firms are always more sensitive, which reveals the findings of the test 
on firm size independently. Surprisingly, GMM finds cash flow as insignificant 
estimator of investment. The only significant estimator for the four categories is the 
coefficient for small firms paying high dividend (0.091). As the other variables are 
all insignificant, the results cannot be compared. Another significant estimator is 
the lagged investment rate. It is reported at a significant value of 0.188. All the 
conditions for model fitness are tested. I find no problem for fixed-effect model and 
the instrumental variables are valid and significant. 
 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 report the results for dividend 
dummy interacted with sales dummy. Q is found positive and significant by the two 
techniques (0.088 and 0.047 respectively). Similar to columns (1) and (2) in Table 
4.11, most and least sensitive firms both come from relative constrained category. 
Small firms paying high dividend are most sensitive with a value of 0.224 while 
large firms paying low dividend are least sensitive with a value of 0.136. Once again, 
firms paying high dividend are found more sensitive no matter how the size is 
categorized, small or large. Additionally, small firms are more sensitive all the time 
for high or low dividend payment level. In comparison, GMM reveals significant 
value for small firms paying low dividend only. Again, no significant values for the 
other three categories are found and hence the results could not be compared. 
Lagged investment rate is estimated statistically significant at 0.117. Finally, I find 
no problem for model fitness. All preconditions are satisfied. 
 
To conclude, the outcome for two dummy variables interacted is clear. Two different 
measurements of firm size reveal identical results. Large firms paying low dividend 
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is found to be most sensitive, with small firms paying high dividend least sensitive. 
Dividend is found as an influential indicator that sheds light on investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. Using dividend as measurement of financial constraint will lead to 
.DSODQDQG=LQJDOHV¶UHVXOWVZLWKRXWFRQVLGHULQJWKHHIIHFWRIILUPVL]H%\FRQWUDVW
Fazzari HWDO¶s finding is confirms by using firm size as the measure of financial 
constraint, regardless the dividend payment level. Nevertheless, GMM is found to 
be a weak method in this research as the coefficients from GMM is always 
insignificant.  
 
Table 4.12 Variable Correlation²Dividend Payment 
 Firms with low dividend payment  
INV CF Q DIV TA TS 
Mean: .6070973 .2890828 7.333354 .014212 6.319998 5.31117 
Correlation: 
INV 1.0000      
CF 0.5339 1.0000     
Q 0.4754 0.0989 1.0000    
DIV -0.1000 0.1020 -0.1215 1.0000   
TA 0.0982 -0.1481 0.5723 -0.2032 1.0000  
TS -0.0247 0.1040 0.2296 -0.0242 0.5450 1.0000 
 Firms with high dividend payment  
Mean: .7741144 1.826009 8.96838 1.681852 7.886085 7.525978 
Correlation: 
INV 1.0000      
CF 0.7381 1.0000     
Q 0.3537 0.3308 1.0000    
DIV 0.5091 0.2614 0.1285 1.0000   
TA 0.2731 0.1522 0.3186 0.5281 1.0000  
TS 0.2342 0.2208 0.1788 0.5126 0.6805 1.0000 
 
Finally, following Moyen (2004), I test the correlation between variables used in 
previous researches, and try to explain investment-cash flow sensitivity from a 
broader context. The correlation of variables for firms whose financial status is 
grouped by dividend payment is reported in Table 4.12. According to the table, low 
dividend payers make fewer investments than high dividend payers with mean of 
0.607 to 0.774. Meanwhile, the relationship between investment rate and dividend 
 53 
 
payment for firms paying low dividend is negative, indicating that such firms have 
to choose between investment and dividend payment for limited internal capital, 
thus they are relatively constrained.  
 
Table 4.13 shows the variable correlation of firms divided by total assets. As 
expected, large firms are reported to make more investment (0.706 to 0.539). 
However, small firms seem to generate more cash flow than large ones. The reason 
might be that they pay fewer dividends (0.039 on average). Moreover, they may 
not invest in fixed assets which in this research is the definition of investment, but 
in some other field, for example profitable projects, to make the company grow 
faster, which further explains why small firms have low investment rate but high 
cash flow. On the other hand, identical to Table 4.12, small firms reveal negative 
relationship between investment and dividend payment. By contrast, those two are 
positively correlated for large firms. Additionally, cash flow and dividend payment is 
positively correlated as well, implying that large firms are less likely to be 
financially constrained. 
 
Sales is the last criterion used to measure financial constraints and the results are 
reported in Table 4.14. In general, small firms with less sales make similar 
investments as large ones (0.607 to 0.639), but lower cash flow (0.163 to 0.726). 
The dividend payment from small firms is also lower with an average of 0.036 
compared with 0.306 for large ones. Identical to previous analysis, the relationship 
between cash flow and investment for small firm is estimated negative, which 
applies that small firms are likely constrained. By contrast, large firms pay more 
dividends when there is an increase in cash inflow. Meanwhile, large firms make 
more investment with the increase of cash inflow. It seems that large firms care 
less about controlling their internal capital. Hence large firms are considered as 
relatively less constrained.  
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Table 4.13 Variable Correlation²Total Assets 
 Firms with low total assets  
INV CF Q DIV TA TS 
Mean: .5390684 .7280712 5.80398 .0391257 3.560911 3.788709 
Correlation: 
INV 1.0000      
CF 0.7028 1.0000     
Q 0.6142 0.3587 1.0000    
DIV -0.0228 0.0810 0.1083 1.0000   
TA -0.0104 -0.0065 0.3501 0.1363 1.0000  
TS -0.0678 0.1096 0.0594 0.1405 0.5472 1.0000 
 Firms with high total assets  
Mean: .706439 .1158894 9.187387 .2871726 9.417217 7.261887 
Correlation: 
INV 1.0000      
CF 0.5119 1.0000     
Q 0.2898 0.0982 1.0000    
DIV 0.2225 0.1926 0.0246 1.0000   
TA 0.1066 -0.0626 0.2376 0.1122 1.0000  
TS -0.0462 0.2605 -0.0831 0.1754 0.1322 1.0000 
 
Table 4.14 Variable Correlation²Sales 
 Firms with low sales  
INV CF Q DIV TA TS 
Mean: .6067996 .1629426 6.674259 .0358036 4.835309 2.575539 
Correlation: 
INV 1.0000      
CF 0.5521 1.0000     
Q 0.5396  0.0624 1.0000    
DIV -0.0179 0.0458 0.0502 1.0000   
TA 0.1221 -0.2984 0.5453 0.0394 1.0000  
TS -0.1259 0.2172 -0.0887 0.0962 -0.0212 1.0000 
 Firms with high sales  
Mean: .6391714 .725646 8.399296 .3063171 8.318932 8.866878 
Correlation: 
INV 1.0000      
CF 0.5587 1.0000     
Q 0.3826 0.1798 1.0000    
DIV 0.2625 0.1861 0.0899 1.0000   
TA 0.1402 -0.0365 0.4987 0.1629 1.0000  
TS 0.1053 0.0032 0.2481 0.1635 0.5496 1.0000 
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4.3 Discussion 
%DVHG RQ WKH DERYH WHVWV , ILQG WKDW LQWHUQDO ILQDQFH GRHV LQIOXHQFH ILUPV¶
investment decisions. All of the four test techniques confirm that cash flow 
positively and significantly affect investment rate, although the reported 
magnitude is not constant. Fixed-effect model reports the greatest sensitivity of 
investment on cash flow while GMM estimates the lowest coefficient for that 
relationship. First-differencing transformation and OLS give similar magnitude.  
 
Additionally, using three different separating criterions, I divide the firms into 
constrained and unconstrained groups. Dividend payment is firstly tested. 
Surprisingly, the findings are contrary to Fazzari HWDO¶Vresults and in favour of 
.DSODQDQG=LQJDOHV¶7KHGLIIHUHQFHRIVHQVLWLYLW\EHWZHHn the two groups is not 
huge. Firms paying high dividend is reported to be more sensitive than those 
paying low dividend. Moyen (2004) explains that unconstrained firms finance their 
investment not only by internal capital, but also debt. However, the debt effect is 
not captured by the model. Therefore, the sensitivity of unconstrained firms is 
magnified. In addition, unconstrained firms bear greater burden from interest 
SD\PHQW %RQGKROGHUV DUH ZLOOLQJ WR LQIOXHQFH ILUPV¶ LQYHVWPHQW EHKDYLRXU E\
raising covenant (Smith and Warner 1979), which makes unconstrained firms more 
sensitive to the availability of internal capital. The two test techniques reveal similar 
trends. Secondly, I try to split the sample by firm size. Two measurements, total 
assets and sales, reveal identical results. However, no matter which criterion is 
employed, constrained firms always tend to be more sensitive, which supports 
Fazzari et al. Literature concludes that small firms are usually developing fast and 
in great need of capital. As it is difficult for small firms to get access to external 
finance, due to their creditability and profitability, internal finance is essential for 
the growth of small firms. Furthermore, the correlation analysis followed confirms 
that small firms have to choose between dividend payment and investment. 
Therefore, small firms should be more constrained and sensitive. Between the two 
econometric techniques utilized, GMM fails to report significant value on the 
 56 
 
dummy variables created. Therefore, the above results are mainly from fixed-effect 
model.  
 
Following the test for financial constraints by only one indicator, I try to split the 
firms by two interacted indicators. Firms are divided into small paying low dividend 
(most constrained), small paying high dividend (relatively constrained), large 
paying low dividend (relatively constrained), and large paying high dividend (most 
unconstrained). By modifying the measurement of financial constraints, some 
different results appear. Fixed-effect model find that relatively constrained firms 
are most sensitive, regardless whether the constraints are dividend interacted by 
total assets or by sales. It is always more sensitive for firms with high dividend 
payment regardless of firm size and for small firms regardless of dividend payout 
level. All of the test statistics from fixed-effect model are significant. However, 
when GMM is employed, insignificant values appear. Although there are other 
SDSHUV GHULYLQJ LQVLJQLILFDQW YDOXHV IURP *00 +XDQJ QG DQG $÷FD DQG
Mozumdar 2005), all insignificant values are dropped out of the comparison 
between constrained and unconstrained firms.  
 
4.4 Limitations 
I have noticed several limitations in this research. Firstly, the sample is imperfect. 
As shown in the data description, the chosen data is unbalanced. Many companies 
may not report full information for the entire sample period, which could bias the 
outcome. Secondly, the reported statistics may not be exactly accurate and may be 
biased. Although I have processed the data to some extent, lacking of experience 
will lead to insufficient data handling, which could further affect the accuracy of the 
outcomes. In addition, as the sample period covers macro economic depression 
caused by subprime crisis, cash flow is significantly affect by this recession and 
could generate abnormal outcomes. Even though econometric techniques are 
helpful to reduce the effect of such time-specific influence, the impact on data 
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accuracy and reliability is not predictable. Finally, there is not standardized 
calculation of variables used in investment models. Different researchers carry out 
different ways of calculating investment, cash flow and average Q, which could 
factitiously affect the results. I try to use the widely accepted definitions of 
calculation and reduce such effects. However, the use of average Q itself is 
problematic as average Q cannot substitute marginal Q. Further effort could be 
made to produce better indicator for investment opportunities than average Q.  
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CHAPTER č CONCLUSION 
The debate between Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) on investment-cash flow sensitivity has driven many researchers 
studying this topic. In this thesis, I try to illustrate the problem by answering three 
research questions, which are: 
(1) 'RHVWKHDYDLODELOLW\RILQWHUQDOILQDQFHDIIHFWILUPV¶LQYHVWPHQWEHKDYLRXU" 
(2) To what extent does internal finance affect investment levels of financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms? 
(3) Will different measurement of financial constraints affect the outcome? 
 
7RDQVZHUWKHVHTXHVWLRQV,HPSOR\7RELQ¶V4LQYHVWPHQWPRGHOZKLFKLVZLGHO\
used by empirical researches on investment-cash flow sensitivity problem. The 
model is firstly developed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). In theory, the 
PRGHO XVHV 7RELQ¶V PDUJLQDO 4 WR FDSWXUH IXWXUH LQYHVWPHQW RSSRUWXQLW\ DQG
H[DPLQHVWKHHIIHFWRIFDVKIORZRQILUPV¶Lnvestment. However, as marginal Q is 
not observable, empirical studies usually use average Q instead, which by definition, 
is the market value divided by book value of fixed assets. I borrow the same 
definition in this study. Cash flow and investment are divided by capital stock at the 
beginning of each period to set each observation at the same benchmark level.  
 
Using panel data from 2,233 American manufacturing companies obtained from 
COMPUSTAT North America database, the sample is formed by 20,511 firm-year 
observations. The sample period is set to be 10 years, covering 1999 to 2008. Data 
is winsorized to eliminate the effect of extreme values. The guideline is taken from 
Moyen (2004) as follows: investment between 0 and 2, cash flow between -5 and 5, 
Q between 0 and 10, dividend rate between 0 and 5, total assets between 0 and 10, 
and sales between 0 and 10. Several econometric techniques are applied to test the 
regression models, including simple OLS, fixed-effect (within) model, 
first-differencing transformation and instrumental variables by General Method of 
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Moments (GMM). The assumptions and prerequisite conditions for each technique 
are examined to make sure the estimated coefficients are free from any bias. 
 
The findings for the effect of cash flow on investment consist with previous 
literatures. All the four tests find that internal finance has positive effect on 
investment decisions and the coefficients are statistically significant, although the 
scale is divergent. Fixed-effect model reports the highest sensitivity. 
First-differencing transformation and OLS reveal similar middle scale and the 
lowest estimation comes from GMM.  
 
The study also shows that different measurements of financial constraints do affect 
the outcome of investment-cash flow sensitivity. To study the difference between 
constrained and unconstrained firms, dividend and firm size are utilized as the 
splitting criterion. Firms with lower-than-average dividend payment are considered 
as constrained, otherwise unconstrained. Firm size is determined by two indicators, 
which are total assets and sales. Companies with lower-than-average total assets 
(sales) are taken as small and thus financially constrained. Dummy variables are 
created to label different firms from the two groups. Value 1 stands for 
unconstrained firms (high dividend payment, high total assets or high sales) while 
0 is given to constrained ones. Fixed-effect model and GMM are employed to test 
the sensitivity of constrained and unconstrained firms. In general, the findings are 
divergent based on different splitting standard. Firms with low dividend payment 
are found to be less sensitive, which is against the findings of Fazzari et al. The 
magnitude is reported in Table 5.1 and the explanation is given in the following 
context. However, if firms are divided by total assets, the results turn to be 
consistent with Fazzari et al. All the coefficients in the test on dividend criterion and 
firm size criterions are statistically significant given by fixed-effect model, including 
the dummy variable, whereas firm size dummies are reported insignificant by GMM. 
Additionally, GMM reveals significant coefficients for lagged investment rate. 
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Table 5.1 Conclusive Magnitude by Different Splitting Criterions 
 Dividend Total assets Sales 
Constrained 
firms 
(.1544544) 
[.0263583] 
(.2232757) 
[.0228591] 
(.1731248) 
[.0311136] 
Unconstrained 
firms 
(.1792874) 
[.1150502] 
(.1334711) 
[.0400722]γ 
(.1400291) 
[.040451]γ 
The coefficients from fixed-effect model are reported in parenthesis. The 
coefficients from GMM are reported in brackets. γstands for insignificant value. 
 
Besides separating the sample by only one indicator, dividend and firm size are 
interacted to split the firms. Two individual dummy variables (dividend dummy and 
firm size dummy) and one interactive dummy are added into the regression model 
for testing. Accordingly, the firms are divided into four groups, which are small firm 
with low dividend payment (most constrained), small firms with high dividend 
payment (relatively constrained), large firms with low dividend payment (relatively 
constrained) and large firms with high dividend payment (most unconstrained). 
Fixed-effect method shows that firms with high dividend payment are more 
sensitive to cash flow, no matter how firm size is sorted. A possible explanation 
could be that unconstrained firms borrow debt to finance their investment in 
addition to internal capital. However, the debt effect on investment is not measured 
in the investment model and hence the sensitivity of cash flow is enlarged (Moyen 
2004). Meanwhile, such firms bear heavy burden of interest payment, and thus 
existing bondholders will prevent the firms from issuing new debt. Therefore, 
unconstrained firms appear to be more sensitive to internal capital. This also 
explains the outcome of the test on dividend payment independently. Nevertheless, 
small firms are always more sensitive in the categories grouped by dividend. In 
other words, in the high dividend payment group, small firms reveal stronger 
sensitivity. The same is found in low dividend payment group. All the coefficients 
are statistically significant. By contrast, GMM fails to report meaningful statistics in 
this research. All the dummy variables are found insignificant. Therefore, GMM may 
not be a suitable method for this study.  
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Finally, following Moyen (2004), the correlation matrix of variables is generated to 
analyze the investment behaviour in a more general context. For all the three 
splitting criterions, unconstrained firms reveal higher investment than constrained 
ones. All the tests of correlations reveal that the relationship between dividend 
payment and investment for small firms are negative, which proves that small firms 
have to choose between paying dividend and making investment if they have extra 
cash. Thus small firms are relatively more constrained. Surprisingly, small firms are 
found to make higher cash flow on average if grouped by total assets. The reason 
could be that small firms pay fewer dividends and they would invest in other 
profitable projects rather than fixed assets, in seeking for better growth in the 
future. Small firms develop fast and it is common to pay low dividend.  
 
There are limitations in this study, including unbalanced data, inefficient data 
handling and non-uniform approach to calculate variables used in the regression 
model. The use of average Q is also problematic. Further researches are expected 
to improve the DFFXUDF\RIGDWDVHWDQGEHWWHUFDOFXODWLRQRI7RELQ¶V40HDQZKLOH
the choice of suitable test techniques is important as well. Different techniques 
have been proved to give divergent results.  
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APPENDIX: 
1. Data Items: 
 
2. Raw Data Description:  
       prcc_f       20511    15.57192    25.68142      .0001     983.02
        txdc       20511      -.5187    115.5974      -5477       4283
        txdb       20511    101.5814    816.4266      -.313      22899
        sale       20511    2436.452    13041.14      -.234     425071
       ppent       20511    801.2666    4976.061          0     121346
                                                                      
       ppegt       20511    1592.113    9683.478          0     280340
          lt       20511    1678.125    10530.57          0     422932
         ibc       20511    139.6217    1136.959     -24474      45220
          dv       20511    56.94581    379.1149      -.042      10342
         dpc       20511    126.9381    768.7119          0      44667
                                                                      
       dpact       20511    790.8469    4891.045          0     159471
        dltt       20511    515.6103    3565.487          0     191133
        csho       20511    117.9997    492.2261       .001   23177.63
         che       20511    303.8337    1600.879          0      54987
        capx       20511    149.9754     1036.18      -.105   40595.29
                                                                      
      bkvlps       20511    115.9348    14796.28  -1843.915    2117000
          at       20511    2762.345    14399.66          0     448507
       fyear       20511     2003.66    2.829856       1999       2008
    datadate       20511    16295.06    1036.516      14425      18048
       gvkey       20511    52255.98    56032.95       1013     287882
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Financial Statement: Item: Symbol in 
STATA: 
Cash Flow Statement: Capital Expenditures CAPX 
Cash Dividends DV 
Deferred Taxes TXDC 
Depreciation and Amortization DPC 
Income before Extraordinary 
Items 
IBC 
Balance Sheet: Assets²Total AT 
Depreciation, Depletion and 
Amortization (Accumulated) 
DPACT 
Long-term Debt²Total DLTT 
Property, Plant and Equipment 
²Total (Gross) 
PPEGT 
Property, Plant and Equipment 
²Total (Net) 
PPENT 
Income Statement: Sales/Turnover (Net) SALE 
Supplemental Data Items: Price Close²Annual²Fiscal PRCC_F 
Miscellaneous Items: Common Shares Outstanding CSHO 
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3. Test: OLS 
 
 
a) Test of Multicollinearity: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0856756   .0043605   -19.65   0.000    -.0942225   -.0771286
           q     .0877112   .0008871    98.88   0.000     .0859725    .0894499
          cf     .1214746   .0015914    76.33   0.000     .1183553    .1245939
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .53983
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4651
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2, 20508) =10241.71
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =  20511
. regress  inv cf q, robust
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0856756    .009183    -9.33   0.000     -.103675   -.0676762
           q     .0877112   .0011267    77.85   0.000     .0855028    .0899195
          cf     .1214746   .0012449    97.57   0.000     .1190344    .1239148
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    11171.8935 20510  .544704706           Root MSE      =  .53983
                                                       Adj R-squared = 0.4650
    Residual    5976.26136 20508  .291411223           R-squared     =  0.4651
       Model    5195.63216     2  2597.81608           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2, 20508) = 8914.61
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  20511
. regress  inv cf q
           q     0.4655   0.1286   1.0000
          cf     0.5541   1.0000
         inv     1.0000
                                         
                    inv       cf        q
(obs=20511)
. correlate inv cf q
    Mean VIF        1.02
                                    
           q        1.02    0.983474
          cf        1.02    0.983474
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
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b) Test of Heteroscedasticity: 
 
 
 
 
c) Test for Autocorrelation: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
               Total      6535.34      8    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis       180.81      1    0.0000
            Skewness      3303.45      2    0.0000
  Heteroskedasticity      3051.07      5    0.0000
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
         chi2(5)      =   3051.07
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest, white
-
1
0
1
2
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Fitted values
           Prob > F =     0.0000
    F(  1,    2511) =   226.573
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial  inv cf q
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4. Test: Fixed-effect and Random-effect 
a) Fixed-effect Model: 
 
 
b) Random-effect Model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2824, 17684) =     3.80         Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .38884372   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .45863916
     sigma_u    .36583271
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1218717   .0118449   -10.29   0.000    -.1450888   -.0986545
           q     .0905597   .0015525    58.33   0.000     .0875166    .0936028
          cf     .1565072   .0013759   113.75   0.000     .1538103     .159204
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2813                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(2,17684)         =  12392.20
       overall = 0.4611                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3497                                        avg =       7.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.5836                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: gvkey                           Number of groups   =      2825
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    20511
. xtreg  inv cf q , fe
                                                                              
         rho    .26486694   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .45863916
     sigma_u    .27529735
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0935973   .0116485    -8.04   0.000    -.1164279   -.0707667
           q     .0922503   .0013119    70.32   0.000     .0896789    .0948216
          cf     .1450516   .0012573   115.37   0.000     .1425873    .1475159
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =  24741.52
       overall = 0.4637                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3581                                        avg =       7.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.5831                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: gvkey                           Number of groups   =      2825
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =    20511
. xtreg  inv cf q , re
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c) Hausman Test: 
 
 
d) Test between Pooled and Random-effect Model: 
 
 
5. Test: First-differencing Transformation 
 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =     0.0000
                          =     773.46
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
           q      .0905597     .0922503       -.0016906        .0008301
          cf      .1565072     .1450516        .0114556        .0005587
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) = 3965.60
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0757886       .2752974
                       e     .2103499       .4586392
                     inv    .5447047       .7380411
                                                       
                                Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        inv[gvkey,t] = Xb + u[gvkey] + e[gvkey,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
                                                                              
         D1.     .1328339    .002903    45.76   0.000     .1271415    .1385263
          cf  
         D1.     .1013758   .0019443    52.14   0.000     .0975633    .1051883
           q  
                                                                              
       D.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 2722 clusters in gvkey)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .57206
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4984
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  2721) = 7302.54
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =  17287
. reg d.inv d.q d.cf, noc robust cluster (gvkey)
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6. Test : Instrumental Variable by GMM 
 
 
a) J-test: 
 
 
b) Test for Weak Instruments: 
 
 
Instruments:   D.cf D.q L2.inv L3.inv
Instrumented:  LD.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0483893   .0028439    17.02   0.000     .0428154    .0539633
           q  
         D1.     .0379426   .0057217     6.63   0.000     .0267282     .049157
          cf  
         LD.      .207658   .0236257     8.79   0.000     .1613525    .2539635
         inv  
                                                                              
       D.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 2288 clusters in gvkey)
GMM weight matrix: Cluster (gvkey)                     Root MSE      =  .49751
                                                       R-squared     =      .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                       Wald chi2(3)  =       .
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =  11739
  Hansen's J chi2(1) = .858087 (p = 0.3543)
  Test of overidentifying restriction:
. estat overid
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2, 11735) =  702.09
 ( 2)  L3.inv = 0
 ( 1)  L2.inv = 0
. test l2.inv l3.inv
                                                                              
         L3.     .1008423   .0049727    20.28   0.000     .0910951    .1105896
         L2.    -.4888225   .0130485   -37.46   0.000    -.5143997   -.4632453
         inv  
         D1.    -.0239786   .0020566   -11.66   0.000    -.0280099   -.0199474
           q  
         D1.    -.0215254   .0031402    -6.85   0.000    -.0276807     -.01537
          cf  
                                                                              
      LD.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .41618
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2567
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4, 11735) =  375.74
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =  11739
. regress dl.inv d.cf d.q l2.inv l3.inv, robust noc
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7. Test: Dividend Criterion  
a) Fixed-effect Model: 
 
 
b) Instrumental Variable by GMM: 
 
 
c) J-test: 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2824, 17683) =     3.78         Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .38876411   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .4582293
     sigma_u    .36544457
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1255572   .0118519   -10.59   0.000    -.1487881   -.1023264
     Ddiv_cf      .024833   .0043461     5.71   0.000     .0163142    .0333518
           q     .0906324   .0015512    58.43   0.000     .0875919    .0936728
          cf     .1544544   .0014208   108.71   0.000     .1516694    .1572393
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2866                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(3,17683)         =   8287.14
       overall = 0.4629                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3546                                        avg =       7.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.5844                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: gvkey                           Number of groups   =      2825
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    20511
. xtreg  inv cf q Ddiv_cf, fe
Instruments:   D.cf D.q D.Ddiv_cf L2.inv L3.inv
Instrumented:  LD.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0886919   .0085089    10.42   0.000     .0720148     .105369
     Ddiv_cf  
         D1.     .0469957   .0027335    17.19   0.000      .041638    .0523533
           q  
         D1.     .0263583   .0054289     4.86   0.000      .015718    .0369987
          cf  
         LD.     .1942064     .02285     8.50   0.000     .1494212    .2389916
         inv  
                                                                              
       D.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 2288 clusters in gvkey)
GMM weight matrix: Cluster (gvkey)                     Root MSE      =  .4887
                                                       R-squared     =      .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                       Wald chi2(4)  =       .
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =  11739
  Hansen's J chi2(1) = .864581 (p = 0.3525)
  Test of overidentifying restriction:
. estat overid
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d) Test for Weak Instruments: 
 
 
8. Test: Total Assets Criterion 
a) Fixed-effect Model: 
 
 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2, 11734) =  723.25
 ( 2)  L3.inv = 0
 ( 1)  L2.inv = 0
. test l2.inv l3.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     -.033782   .0078541    -4.30   0.000    -.0491773   -.0183867
     Ddiv_cf  
         L3.     .1013165   .0049607    20.42   0.000     .0915926    .1110403
         L2.    -.4912642   .0129214   -38.02   0.000    -.5165923   -.4659361
         inv  
         D1.     -.023567   .0020753   -11.36   0.000    -.0276349   -.0194991
           q  
         D1.    -.0172737   .0034473    -5.01   0.000     -.024031   -.0105164
          cf  
                                                                              
      LD.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .41525
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2601
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5, 11734) =  312.86
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =  11739
. regress dl.inv d.cf d.q l2.inv l3.inv d.Ddiv_cf, robust noc
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2824, 17683) =     4.02         Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho     .4151551   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .4452427
     sigma_u    .37512987
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0048308   .0120373    -0.40   0.688     -.028425    .0187634
      Dta_cf    -.0898046   .0027312   -32.88   0.000     -.095158   -.0844511
           q     .0718012   .0016115    44.55   0.000     .0686424    .0749599
          cf     .2232757   .0024305    91.86   0.000     .2185117    .2280398
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2394                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(3,17683)         =   9126.48
       overall = 0.4715                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3076                                        avg =       7.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.6076                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: gvkey                           Number of groups   =      2825
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    20511
. xtreg  inv cf q Dta_cf, fe
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b) Instrumental Variable by GMM: 
 
 
c) J-test:
 
 
d) Test for Weak Instruments: 
 
Instruments:   D.cf D.q D.Dta_cf L2.inv L3.inv
Instrumented:  LD.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0172131    .011439     1.50   0.132     -.005207    .0396332
      Dta_cf  
         D1.     .0488345   .0028803    16.95   0.000     .0431892    .0544797
           q  
         D1.     .0228591   .0120641     1.89   0.058    -.0007861    .0465043
          cf  
         LD.     .2066552   .0236452     8.74   0.000     .1603114     .252999
         inv  
                                                                              
       D.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 2288 clusters in gvkey)
GMM weight matrix: Cluster (gvkey)                     Root MSE      =   .497
                                                       R-squared     =      .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                       Wald chi2(4)  =       .
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =  11739
  Hansen's J chi2(1) = .777063 (p = 0.3780)
  Test of overidentifying restriction:
. estat overid
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2, 11734) =  701.87
 ( 2)  L3.inv = 0
 ( 1)  L2.inv = 0
. test l2.inv l3.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0051096   .0075402     0.68   0.498    -.0096703    .0198896
      Dta_cf  
         L3.     .1008981    .004975    20.28   0.000     .0911464    .1106499
         L2.    -.4887727   .0130492   -37.46   0.000    -.5143514   -.4631941
         inv  
         D1.     -.023843   .0020858   -11.43   0.000    -.0279314   -.0197545
           q  
         D1.    -.0259915   .0076831    -3.38   0.001    -.0410517   -.0109313
          cf  
                                                                              
      LD.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .41616
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2569
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5, 11734) =  300.51
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =  11739
. regress dl.inv d.cf d.q l2.inv l3.inv d.Dta_cf, robust noc
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9. Test: Sales Criterion 
a) Fixed-effect Model: 
 
 
b) Instrumental Variable by GMM: 
 
 
c) J-test: 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2824, 17683) =     3.84         Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .39137679   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .45631221
     sigma_u    .36591935
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1024819   .0118722    -8.63   0.000    -.1257526   -.0792112
      Dts_cf    -.0330957   .0024545   -13.48   0.000    -.0379067   -.0282847
           q     .0885186    .001552    57.03   0.000     .0854764    .0915607
          cf     .1731248   .0018419    93.99   0.000     .1695144    .1767351
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2681                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(3,17683)         =   8406.55
       overall = 0.4630                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3439                                        avg =       7.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.5878                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: gvkey                           Number of groups   =      2825
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    20511
. xtreg  inv cf q Dts_cf, fe
Instruments:   D.cf D.q D.Dts_cf L2.inv L3.inv
Instrumented:  LD.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0093374   .0082895     1.13   0.260    -.0069097    .0255845
      Dts_cf  
         D1.     .0482607   .0028293    17.06   0.000     .0427155     .053806
           q  
         D1.     .0311136   .0089249     3.49   0.000     .0136211    .0486061
          cf  
         LD.     .2055418   .0237833     8.64   0.000     .1589275    .2521561
         inv  
                                                                              
       D.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 2288 clusters in gvkey)
GMM weight matrix: Cluster (gvkey)                     Root MSE      =  .49688
                                                       R-squared     =      .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                       Wald chi2(4)  =       .
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =  11739
  Hansen's J chi2(1) = .789297 (p = 0.3743)
  Test of overidentifying restriction:
. estat overid
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d) Test for Weak Instruments: 
 
 
10. Test: Dividend and Total Assets Interacted 
a) Fixed-effect Model: 
 
 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2, 11734) =  703.23
 ( 2)  L3.inv = 0
 ( 1)  L2.inv = 0
. test l2.inv l3.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0017067   .0059832     0.29   0.775    -.0100213    .0134347
      Dts_cf  
         L3.       .10085   .0049732    20.28   0.000     .0911017    .1105982
         L2.    -.4886881   .0130346   -37.49   0.000     -.514238   -.4631381
         inv  
         D1.    -.0239945   .0020537   -11.68   0.000    -.0280201    -.019969
           q  
         D1.    -.0227588   .0059513    -3.82   0.000    -.0344244   -.0110932
          cf  
                                                                              
      LD.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .41619
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2568
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5, 11734) =  301.53
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =  11739
. regress dl.inv d.cf d.q l2.inv l3.inv d.Dts_cf, robust noc
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2824, 17681) =     3.97         Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .41650653   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .44393041
     sigma_u    .37506608
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0075579   .0120068    -0.63   0.529    -.0310923    .0159766
         DX1    -.0308336   .0113938    -2.71   0.007    -.0531666   -.0085006
      Dta_cf    -.0915262   .0028058   -32.62   0.000    -.0970259   -.0860265
     Ddiv_cf     .0684141    .010546     6.49   0.000     .0477428    .0890853
           q     .0713408   .0016083    44.36   0.000     .0681884    .0744932
          cf     .2211761   .0024575    90.00   0.000     .2163592    .2259931
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2462                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(5,17681)         =   5529.65
       overall = 0.4748                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3140                                        avg =       7.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.6099                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: gvkey                           Number of groups   =      2825
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    20511
. xtreg  inv cf q Ddiv_cf Dta_cf DX1, fe
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b) Instrumental Variable by GMM: 
 
 
 
c) J-test: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instruments:   D.cf D.q D.Ddiv_cf D.Dta_cf DX1 L2.inv L3.inv
Instrumented:  LD.inv
                                                                              
         DX1    -.0078749   .0050378    -1.56   0.118    -.0177489     .001999
         D1.     .0083576   .0114163     0.73   0.464    -.0140179     .030733
      Dta_cf  
         D1.     .0912642   .0089055    10.25   0.000     .0738096    .1087187
     Ddiv_cf  
         D1.     .0471591   .0027763    16.99   0.000     .0417176    .0526005
           q  
         D1.     .0191146   .0118968     1.61   0.108    -.0042028    .0424319
          cf  
         LD.     .1879015   .0224015     8.39   0.000     .1439953    .2318077
         inv  
                                                                              
       D.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 2288 clusters in gvkey)
GMM weight matrix: Cluster (gvkey)                     Root MSE      =  .48709
                                                       R-squared     =      .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                       Wald chi2(6)  =       .
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =  11739
  Hansen's J chi2(1) = .676384 (p = 0.4108)
  Test of overidentifying restriction:
. estat overid
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d) Test for Weak Instruments: 
 
 
11. Test: Dividend and Sales Interacted 
a) Fixed-effect Model: 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2, 11732) =  723.40
 ( 2)  L3.inv = 0
 ( 1)  L2.inv = 0
. test l2.inv l3.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0159627   .0340701     0.47   0.639    -.0508204    .0827458
         DX1  
         D1.     .0081485    .007535     1.08   0.280    -.0066214    .0229184
      Dta_cf  
         D1.    -.0503357   .0339135    -1.48   0.138    -.1168119    .0161404
     Ddiv_cf  
         L3.     .1014753   .0049663    20.43   0.000     .0917405      .11121
         L2.    -.4912853   .0129204   -38.02   0.000    -.5166116   -.4659591
         inv  
         D1.    -.0233268   .0021061   -11.08   0.000    -.0274552   -.0191985
           q  
         D1.    -.0242593    .007749    -3.13   0.002    -.0394485     -.00907
          cf  
                                                                              
      LD.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .41519
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2604
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7, 11732) =  223.78
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =  11739
. regress dl.inv d.cf d.q l2.inv l3.inv d.Ddiv_cf d.Dta_cf d.DX1, robust noc
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2824, 17681) =     3.80         Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .39228718   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .45538282
     sigma_u    .36587228
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1059075   .0118547    -8.93   0.000     -.129144    -.082671
         DX2    -.0201455   .0106048    -1.90   0.057     -.040932     .000641
      Dts_cf    -.0358918   .0025586   -14.03   0.000    -.0409069   -.0308768
     Ddiv_cf     .0529573   .0095066     5.57   0.000     .0343235    .0715911
           q     .0884047    .001549    57.07   0.000     .0853686    .0914409
          cf     .1715116   .0018625    92.09   0.000      .167861    .1751623
                                                                              
         inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2747                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(5,17681)         =   5079.39
       overall = 0.4654                                        max =        10
       between = 0.3491                                        avg =       7.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.5896                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: gvkey                           Number of groups   =      2825
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =    20511
. xtreg  inv cf q Ddiv_cf Dts_cf DX2, fe
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b) Instrumental Variable by GMM: 
 
c) J-test: 
 
 
d) Test for Weak Instruments:  
 
 
Instruments:   D.cf D.q D.Ddiv_cf D.Dts_cf D.DX2 L2.inv L3.inv
Instrumented:  LD.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0307786   .0407359     0.76   0.450    -.0490622    .1106195
         DX2  
         D1.    -.0065572   .0087925    -0.75   0.456    -.0237901    .0106757
      Dts_cf  
         D1.      .062415   .0397653     1.57   0.117    -.0155235    .1403536
     Ddiv_cf  
         D1.     .0470208   .0027306    17.22   0.000     .0416688    .0523727
           q  
         D1.     .0306848    .008827     3.48   0.001     .0133841    .0479854
          cf  
         LD.     .1942904   .0229453     8.47   0.000     .1493185    .2392623
         inv  
                                                                              
       D.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 2288 clusters in gvkey)
GMM weight matrix: Cluster (gvkey)                     Root MSE      =  .48861
                                                       R-squared     =      .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                       Wald chi2(6)  =       .
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =  11739
  Hansen's J chi2(1) = .904612 (p = 0.3415)
  Test of overidentifying restriction:
. estat overid
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2, 11732) =  724.56
 ( 2)  L3.inv = 0
 ( 1)  L2.inv = 0
. test l2.inv l3.inv
                                                                              
         D1.     .0009648   .0280982     0.03   0.973    -.0541123    .0560418
         DX2  
         D1.     .0074421   .0059566     1.25   0.212    -.0042338    .0191181
      Dts_cf  
         D1.    -.0369694   .0276325    -1.34   0.181    -.0911337     .017195
     Ddiv_cf  
         L3.     .1013803   .0049603    20.44   0.000     .0916574    .1111033
         L2.      -.49083   .0128981   -38.05   0.000    -.5161125   -.4655476
         inv  
         D1.    -.0236086   .0020735   -11.39   0.000     -.027673   -.0195442
           q  
         D1.    -.0223664    .005947    -3.76   0.000    -.0340235   -.0107093
          cf  
                                                                              
      LD.inv        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   .4152
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2604
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7, 11732) =  224.36
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =  11739
. regress dl.inv d.cf d.q l2.inv l3.inv d.Ddiv_cf d.Dts_cf d.DX2, robust noc
